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I. INTRODUCTION
The right to ajury trial is "the only anchor yet imagined by man, by which
government can be held to the principles of its constitution."
-Thomas Jefferson
1
"Gentlemen, trials are too important to be left up to juries."
-Rankin Fitch (fictitious attorney portrayed by actor Gene Hackman)2
It is "oft-stated"" that a trial "is simply a dispute resolution system"4
in which the primary objective is "search [ing] for truth. ,5  If truth-
seeking is the end sought, then some might argue that the means
have devolved into all-encompassing, win-at-all-costs endeavors6 that
facilitate or encourage the use of "dubious tactics" by trial attorneys.7
1 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 71 (H.A. Washington ed., Washington, D.C., Tay-
lor & Maury 1854).
2 RUNAWAYJURY (20th Century Fox 2003).
3 Stephen D. Easton, That Is Not All There Is: Enhancing Daubert Exclusion by Applying "Ordi-
nary" Witness Principles to Experts, 84 NEB. L. REv. 675, 686 (2006); see also id. at 686 n.26
(citing United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980), quoted inJames v. Illinois, 493
U.S. 307, 311 (1990) ("[A]rriving at the truth is a fundamental goal of our legal sys-
tem.")).
4 Richard S. Walinski, The ABA's New Vision of theJury's Function: An Opposing View, 32 A.B.A.
LIT. 5, 6 (Spring 2006).
5 Kelly Kszywienski, Roadblock in the Search for Truth: What Are a Criminal Prosecutor's Constitu-
tional and Ethical Obligations When the Evidence Supports Multiple, Inconsistent Theories of a
Crime?, 37 U. TOL. L. REv. 1111, 1123 (2006) (quoting In re Sakarias, 106 P.3d 931, 942
(Cal. 2005)). But seeJacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United
States Legal Practice, 54 AM.J. COMP. L. 717, 717 (2006) (stating that the criminal justice
adversarial process "validates convictions as the outcome of a contest between parties
rather than the search for truth").
6 See Glenn Garvin, That's Why the Good Lord Gave Us TiVo, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 21, 2006, at
2E (reviewing a new television legal drama in which young district attorneys are in-
structed that "'[their] job is to win .... Justice is God's problem'"); see also Margaret Gra-
ham Tebo, Law in the Low Country, 87 A.B.A.J. 40 (2001) (contrasting the civility of the
legal practice in Charleston, South Carolina with the general prevalence of trial lawyers'
aggressive tactics); Peter Brown, Lawyers' Party Hits a New Low, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May
16, 2003, at A22 (stating that trial lawyers have a "'win-at-all-costs' ... mentality"). In
2002, the American Bar Association (ABA) published results of a consumer survey that
found 74% of the public believed "lawyers are more interested in winning than in seeing
that justice is served." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF LAWYERS:
CONSUMER RESEARCH FINDINGS 7 (Litigation 2002) [hereinafter A.B.A. PUBLIC
PERCEPTIONS OF LAWYERS].
7 FrankJ. Murray, Modern-Day Jousters Continue to Battle for Respect-Huge Decisions Don't Help
Image, WASH. TIMES, July 17, 2000, at Al (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Chief Justice Harding of the Florida Supreme Court). One commentator noted: "The
most effective litigation tactics become those that suppress, distort, or otherwise defeat
the truth. The implicit conclusion is that lying... is acceptable, if that is what it takes to
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Reliance upon these "dubious tactics" perpetuates stereotypes that
"lawyers are untrustworthy, manipulative, and [are] determined to
win at all costs."'8  Despite efforts within the profession both to ad-
dress and correct these preconceived notions, 9 "generally negative
perceptions"10 of the legal profession remain pervasive. "
One particular area that remains a veritable 'Achilles heel'
wrought with tactical and strategic uncertainty is jury selection.
12
Commentators emphasize that "the most important people in the
courtroom are the jurors," 1 and it has been characterized as "conven-
tional wisdom ... that most trials are won or lost in jury selection."
1 4
The American Bar Association (ABA) recently issued guidelines em-
phasizing the importance of jury selection in capital cases. 15  Voir
dire,16 especially in capital cases,17 comprises the "ultimate part of the
win. Lawyers now routinely present lies to courts and juries." Mark S. Pulliam, The Law-
yers' War on Law: It Didn't End with Florida, AM. ENTERPRISE, Mar. 1, 2001, at 21, 22-23.
8 Murray, supra note 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). See Garvin, supra note 6.
9 See, e.g., Michael Dayton, Winston-Salem Lawyer to Head N.C. Academy of Trial Lawyers in
2005-06, N.C. LAW. WEEKLY, June 13, 2005 (recounting recent efforts to address negative
media and correct "negative perceptions that the public has of trial lawyers").
10 Jim Hever, Mind Your Business, LAWYER, Oct. 31, 2005, at 27.
11 See, e.g., A.B.A. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF LAWYERS, supra note 6, at 8, 17 (reporting that
more than 70% of the public believed lawyers "manipulate both the system and the truth"
and approximately 34% believed lawyers "deserve the bad reputation that they have").
12 See Warren Richey, High Court Revisits Racial Bias injury Selection, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR,
Oct. 16, 2002, at 3 (noting that the problem ofjuror selection, particularly with regard to
race, is the Achilles heel of the Americanjustice system).
13 Margaret Covington, Juy Selection: Innovative Approaches to Both Civil and Criminal Litiga-
tion, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 575, 575 (1985).
14 John H. Blume et al., Probing "Life Qualification" Through Expanded Voir Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 1209, 1209 (2001); see also Herald Price Fahringer, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall... ":
Body Language, Intuition, and the Art of Jury Selection, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 197, 197
(1993) ("Acknowledged experts in the field believe that eighty-five percent of the cases
litigated are won or lost when the jury is selected."); Steven C. Serio, A Process Right Due?
Examining Whether a Capital Defendant Has a Due Process Right to a Jury Selection Expert, 53
AM. U. L. REv. 1143, 1147 (2004) ("Many scholars believe that most capital cases are won
or lost during jury selection."). But see Dale W. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Em-
pirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 507 (1965) (noting that many lawyers view voir dire
with "disdain, as unlikely to affect materially the result, regardless of what was said or who
was challenged or left on the panel").
15 See American Bar Association, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Coun-
sel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 913, 1049 (2003) [hereinafter A.B.A., Defense
Counsel Guidelines].
16 The term "voir dire" is "an ancient phrase literally meaning 'to speak the truth.'" WAYNE
R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.3, at 1050 (West, 4th ed. 2004).
17 See Blume et al., supra note 14, at 1209-11 (2001) (explaining that if the conventional
wisdom that trials are won and lost at voir dire is correct, then its importance is more pro-
found in capital cases). The right to an impartial jury in both criminal and civil cases is
discussed infra Part II.A.
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trial."18  Simply stated, "the importance of selecting the right jury
cannot be overemphasized."1 9
Considering that "once the last person on the jury is seated, the
trial is essentially won or lost,"'20 it is surprising that jury selection, the
"single most important aspect of the trial proceedings,"2 1 remains cast
as "mysterious, 2 2 a "guessing game,2 3 often imbued by "seat-of-the-
pants, back-of-the-neck judgment."24  Law schools often bypass in-
struction in jury selection, deemed "the most difficult" part 25 of a
trial, when designing their skills-based curricula. 6 This pedagogical
void may be justified for two reasons. First, jury selection is a "skill
which is hard to teach and even more difficult to perform well.,
27
Second, practitioners characterize impaneling a jury as a "work of
art '28 to which "no science or formula" attaches 29 rather than an aca-
30demic exercise.
18 Serio, supra note 14, at 1147-48.
19 Jim Goodwin, Note, Articulating the Inarticulable: Relying on Nonverbal Behavioral Cues to
Deception to Strike Jurors During Voir Dire, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 739, 745 (1996). It is well-
recognized that "jury selection can make or break a case." Bruce Cadwallader, The Clarett
Trial; Finding 12 GoodJurors for No. 13 May Be Hard, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Sept. 17,
2006, at ID.
20 Covington, supra note 13, at 575-76.
21 Id. at 575; see alsoJamie Thompson, Is Jury Pool of 104 Big Enough? Nope, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES (Fla.),July 15, 2005, at IA ("Selecting ajury is perhaps the most important act law-
yers perform during a trial.").
22 David Hitmer & Eric J.R. Nichols, Jury Selection in Federal Civil Litigation: General Procedures,
New Rules, and the Arrival of Batson, 23 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 407, 409 (1992).
23 Matt Roush, Going Inside Jury Room'for Human Side ofJustice, USA TODAY, Apr. 16, 1997, at
3D.
24 Covington, supra note 13, at 582 (citation omitted).
25 See American Morning (CNN television broadcast Jan. 6, 2004) (discussing jury selection in
the Martha Stewart case).
26 See Tracy L. Treger, Note, One Jury Indivisible: A Group Dynamics Approach to Voir Dire, 68
CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 549, 561 (1992) ("[A]t least one commentator has noticed the paucity
of instruction in voir dire in trial advocacy courses."). Lack of law school training is high-
lighted by the rise of educational programs designed to "enhance ... skills in areas such
as voir dire." Texas Access to Justice Commission Empowers Legal Aid Lawyers Through Training
on Litigation and Appellate Advocacy, BUS. WIRE,June 1, 2006.
27 The Abrams Report (MSNBC television broadcast Dec. 30, 2004) (discussing jury selection
in the context of a Michael Jackson trial); see also Covington, supra note 13, at 590 ("Law
schools are more concerned with well-written briefs than eloquent oral presentations.").
28 E. Maurice Braswell, Voir Dire-Use and Abuse, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 49, 49 (1970)
("[V]oir dire has become a work of art to the legal profession."); see also Cadwallader, su-
pra note 19 ("[Capital University law professor Max Kravitz] called jury selection] an 'art
form' that takes years to develop."); Theodore Dalrymple, Trial By Human Beings: The Jury
System and its Discontents, NAT'L REV., Apr. 25, 2005, at 30 (describing jury selection as a
"black art"); Krysten Crawford, Scrushy's Game of Jury Jeopardy, CNNMONEY.COM, June 14,
2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/14/news/newsmakers/juries/index.htm ("Pick-
ing the right jury.., is more art than science."). One commentator likened jury selec-
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A. The Art-Science Dichotomy ofJury Selection
The extent to which no formula applies to jury selection is best
exemplified by the methodologies trial attorneys traditionally employ
to select juries. Lawyers often rely upon "hunches, instinct, and edu-
cated guesswork,"'" none of which are exact.12 For example, defense
consultants hired during the O.J. Simpson trial noted preferences for
prospective jurors who "would be more cerebral than emotional in
their answers to voir dire questions. In addition to considering the
form and substance of juror responses,34 lawyers also scrutinize non-
tion to "voodoo." See Fox on the Record with Greta Van Susteren: Analysis of Scott Peterson Trial
(Fox News Network television broadcast Nov. 10, 2004) (featuring an interview in which
host Greta Van Susteren asks, "All right. Howard, how much ofjury selection is science?
How much is art? And the term I always use how much is voodoo?").
29 Kristen Reed, Lawyers To Begin Picking Jury, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 5, 2006, at Cl; see also
Matt Krupnick, Dyleski Trial Highlights Jury Selection Difficulties: Experts Say Finding People Not
an Exact Science, and High-Profile Cases Are Even Harder, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Cal.), July
18, 2006, at Al ("[Experts say] there's little to suggest that jury selection is a science.").
But see Jeff Kass, Traits of the 'Right'Juror-Many Factors Will Be Weighed in Picking Panel in
Bryant Case, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Colo.), July 12, 2004, at 6A (" [J]ury selection is as
much art as science."); Meg Laughlin, Changes Sought in Al-Arian Jury Questionnaire, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Feb. 1, 2006, at 4B ("[Jury selection is] an imperfect science.");
Claude Solnik, Mock Juries Offer a Scrimmage or a Trial Run for Savvy Lawyers, LONG ISLAND
Bus. NEWS (N.Y.), Mar. 3, 2006 ("[S]electing and tailoring cases to jurors has become a
science.").
30 See Crawford, supra note 28 ("1J]ury picking is more of a crap shoot [than a science].");
see also Lee V. Coffee, 'Foxhole Formula'Picks Panel, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Tenn.), Sept. 19,
2004, at B8 ('Jury selection is an inexact process that is more akin to a lottery than a sci-
ence."). The inexact process of jury selection mirrors the enigma of jury deliberations.
See Joanne Ostrow, Jury's Closed-Door Task Opens to Dramatic Documentary, DENVER POST,
Apr. 15, 1997, at El (reporting on a CBS documentary that touts, "For the first time,
cameras secured in the walls and operated by remote control allow viewers to intrude into
the sanctity of the jury room").
31 Covington, supra note 13, at 577; see also Treger, supra note 26, at 561 ("[L]awyers have
relied on their own intuition and beliefs, along with a modicum of common sense, to
guess which venirepersons will be the most sympathetic to their clients.").
32 "The success of [a lawyer's] 'gut feeling' approach is difficult to measure." Treger, supra
note 26, at 561; see also Debra Sahler, Comment, Scientifically SelectingJurors While Maintain-
ing Professional Responsibility: A Proposed Model Rule, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 383, 384 n.2
(1996) ("Early jury selection methods relied on relatively basic statistical techniques to
determine the association amongst certain demographic or background characteristics
and attitudes of the community."). It is difficult to discern how individuals might re-
spond in cases because "people have particular opinions and preconceptions that they
don't even know how it will affect them." Jamie Satterfield, Choosing Jury Part Finesse, Part
Gut; Selection for 'Death-Qualified'Jurors Continues Today in Stanton Trial, KNOXVILLE NEWS-
SENTINEL (Tenn.), May 15, 2003, at Al (emphasis added). Moreover, jurors may "lie
about their attitudes and prejudices during voir dire." Covington, supra note 13, at 580.
33 JudgingJurors, 81 A.B.A.J. 35, 35 (1995).
34 One criticism of lawyers during voir dire is that they "use it as an opportunity to preach at
the jury" rather than to solicit answers to questions that "cause[] jurors to talk about
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35 . 36 37
verbal cues such as facial features, mannerisms, and attire to pre-
dict personality and predisposition. Furthermore, numerous semi-
nars provide practitioners with "insight and information on the latest
trial techniques" related to jury selection, 8 fostering an era in which
"[t] he days of selecting juries based on an attorney's whim and senses
are being replaced.,
39
Today, jury selection constitutes either "part art, part science ' 4° or
a "highly scientific art form." Both characterizations reflect in-
creased uses of technology42 and infusions ofjury consultants into the
voir dire process. Consultants and lawyers undertake "excessive ef-
forts... to produce juries that they believe will be sympathetic to
their cases. 43 Use of jury consultants, however, is not novel. Thirty-
five years ago, counsel first employed "the use of social scientists as
themselves." Tom Jackson, Jones Day Partner Wins Big For Big Blue, GRAIN'S CLEVELAND
BuS., Apr. 5, 2004. at 3.
35 See, e.g., Kathy A. Goolsby, It's Written All Over Your Face: When It Comes to Personality,
Woman Says She Has You at 'Hello,' DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 24, 2004, at 1P (featuring
a "certified face reader" who has "seen the skill used injury selection").
36 See Sahler, supra note 32, at 389 ("Some jury consultants use 'body language' [and] 'will
know what the odds say about which nefarious nose-touchers to strike"').
37 See, e.g., Diana Walsh, The Art of High-Stakes Jury Picking; 2 Seasoned Consultants Compete in
Courtroom, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 4, 2004, at Al ("'You're taking a lot of factors into considera-
tion,' [one jury consultant] said. 'You're looking at the guy who dresses in the suit and
tie versus the guy who comes in jeans and shorts."').
38 See Case Financial, Inc. Endorsed by Consumer Attorneys of California as Preferred Litigation Fund-
ingProvider, BUS. WIRE, June 24, 2004, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mOEIN/
is2004_June_24/ai n6087055; see also Barbara Jones, Continuing Legal Education Seminar
Centers on the Art, Science ofJury Selection, MINN. LAW., Nov. 18, 2002 (describing a jury se-
lection training program offered by DecisionQuest director of research John D. Gilleland
and attorney Craig D. Diviney); Neighbor; Business Buzz, DAILY HERALD (Chi.), Nov. 4,
2003, at 3 (spotlighting the Trial Lawyers College, an exclusive three-week intensive pro-
gram held at a Wyoming ranch and "presented by famous trial attorney Gerry Spence,"
wherein participants can learn, among other things, how to "master[] jury selection").
39 Sahler, supra note 32, at 384.
40 Satterfield, supra note 32.
41 John D. Bower, Letter to the Editor, Family Praises Hospice Staff HATTIESBURG Am. (Miss.),
Aug. 10, 2002, at 7A. One jury consultant described the coalescence of art and science:
"While the science of jury selection is knowing what research shows and applying it ap-
propriately, the art of it is reading people, understanding group dynamics and under-
standing the theme of the trial ... ." Jones, supra note 38.
42 See, e.g., Live From... 1:00 PM EST: The Nuts & Bolts of Jury Selection (CNN television
broadcast Feb. 16, 2005) (describing jury consulting firms' facilities "with mock court-
rooms, closed-circuit cameras, video editing and a high-tech control room that rivals
some TV studios"); see also Martha Bellisle, Local Legal Experts Debate Juiy Selection System,
RENO GAZETrE-JOURNAL (Nev.),June 26, 2005, at LA (noting the "growing use of sophis-
ticated techniques to study... the jury selection process. . .
43 Dalrymple, supra note 28.
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consultants in... jury selection,"" facilitating the emergence of an
"expensive" jury consulting industry.4' Now, as proverbial juries de-
liberate over the efficacy of pricy jury consultants, 46 lawyers have be-
gun to utilize new jury selection technologies incorporating com-
puter software solutions 7 that purport to assist with impaneling "a
responsible jury.
48
B. The Specter of Computerized Jury Selection
Software programs designed to isolate and eliminate potential ju-
rors during voir dire are a litigation strategy that critics allege may
constitute "an illegitimate tampering with the adversary system.,
49
Use of the technology presents a formidable challenge for the profes-
sion.5 o As early as 1981, the Congressional Office of Technology As-
44 Dennis P. Stolle et al., The Perceived Fairness of the Psychologist Trial Consultant: An Empirical
Investigation, 20 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 139, 139 & n.1 (1996) (citing United States v.
Ahmad (The Harrisburg Seven Trial), 347 F. Supp. 912 (M.D. Pa. 1972), as "one of the
first cases to use scientific jury selection"). The use of social science techniques and
computers was initially limited to "trials of a political nature." Comment, Computers & Sci-
entific Jury Selection: A Calculated Risk, 55 U. DET.J. URB. L. 345, 345 (1978).
45 See Thompson, supra note 21 (noting the high price of jury consultants); infra note 58
and accompanying text (comparing costs of consultants with the computerized alterna-
tive).
46 See, e.g.,John Caher, The Jury is Still Out on Trial Consultants: Psychologists Don't Just Testify
About the Defendant Anymore, They Help Pick Jurors, TIMES UNION (N.Y.), Oct. 24, 1994, at Al
("Some lawyers view consultants as an essential tool in certain types of cases, but others
dismiss them as purveyors of quack psychology and question whether they really offer any
insight beyond the gut feelings and experiences of a skilled litigator."); see also Peter T.
Kilborn, Investigators in Sniper Case Join Inquiry in W Virginia, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2003, at
A14 (reporting that one judge disallowed jury consultants because he was "confident of
the extensive experience of lawyers at both tables" and that "[]ury selection is certainly a
skill that attorneys develop").
47 As early as 1978, one scholar observed:
with the increased availability of computer access... [,] the trial lawyer will in-
creasingly seek its assistance. Moreover, as the market for such programs and ser-
vices becomes substantial, the computer programming and leasing industry
will ... provide specialized services .... [T]he computer has clearly arrived in the
legal community and its future looks impressive.
Computers and Scientific Jury Selection, supra note 44, at 353.
48 Bellisle, supra note 42 (quoting the brochure for "Trial Science," a company whose high-
tech system purports to identify jury bias).
49 Treger, supra note 26, at 565 (pointing out this harsh critique of "social scientists' in-
volvement with the selection ofjuries").
50 See id. ("[Critics of scientific jury selection] fear that the juries will be manipulated in
such a way that the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury of ones' peers will be-
come meaningless."); see also Recent Cases: Criminal Law--Racial Exclusion injury Pool Com-
position, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2678, 2678 (2003) ("[T]he advent of computerized juror-
selection methods has not put an end to... disputes [regarding the composition ofjury
pools].").
[Vol. 10:1
WHEN BATSON MET GRUTL1ER
sessment (OTA) 5' forecasted that increased use of computer tech-
nology for jury selection could become problematic. 2 It noted "the
growing use of computerized dossiers of potential jurors along with
computer models for predicting juror behavior." 3  Moreover, it cau-
tioned that "future computer technology and social scientific tech-
niques may make this application cheap and improve its effectiveness.
If so, the entire concept of an 'impartial' jury may be challenged."
5 4
The OTA's prescient observations have been realized. 55 "The jury
consulting industry has been growing since the 1970's, ''56 and it has
become "increasingly common for trial lawyers to rely on highly paid
jury consultants." 57 In addition, technological advances have substan-
tially reduced the costs of computer-based alternatives to jury con-
sultants.5 Although jury selection software is becoming a more at-
51 Between 1972 and 1995, the Office of Technology Assessment was a "nonpartisan analyti-
cal agency [that] assisted Congress with the complex and highly technical issues that in-
creasingly affect[ed] our society." Office of Technology Assessment, OTA Archive,
http://www.gpo.gov/ota (last visited Sept. 22, 2007).
52 See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMPUTER-BASED NATIONAL INFORMATION
SYSTEMS: TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 23 (Sept. 1981) [hereinafter OTA
REPORT] (noting potential "Sixth Amendment issue [s]").
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 One television drama "implies, not unreasonably, that.., unless you have some-
one... using fancy software to vet yourjury... you do not stand a chance in court." Robert
Lloyd, Trial Show Does Reality An Injustice, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2006, at E2 (emphasis
added).
56 Note, Developments in the Law: The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1463 (1997); see also
id. ("Jury consulting is a booming industry.... ."). In 1991, jury consulting revenue to-
taled $200 million. Raoul Felder, Justice for Sale--High-Priced Defenses Mock the System,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 6, 1994, at 5J. Estimates in 2001 suggested that jury con-
sulting grew "into a 400 million dollar a year industry." Jonathan M. Redgrave & Jason J.
Stover, The Information Age, Part II: Juror Investigation on the Internet-Implications for the
Trial Lawyer, 2 SEDONA CONF. J. 211, 211 (2001) ("The jury consulting industry has ex-
perienced astonishing growth during the past 30 years."). Although jury selection "was
the main focus when trial consultants first started getting involved with trials," consultants
are now utilized for all facets within the adversarial process. Richard J. Crawford, Trial
Consultants Becoming Integral Part of Legal System, DENVER POST, Mar. 10, 2006, at B7.
57 James D. Zirin, Jackson Trial Jurors: Consultants Will Help to Pick Top 20, TIMES (London),
Feb. 8, 2005, at 3. Costs to retain jury consultants range from $25,000 to more than
$100,000. Amie K. Streater, Computer Technology Lets Lawyers Pick Jurors, PENSACOLA NEWS
JOURNAL (Fla.),Jan. 5, 2003, at 6B.
58 Jury selection software can cost as little as $1,000. See Amie K. Streater, Lawyers Get High-
Tech Help to Pick Jurors, PENSACOLA NEWSJOURNAL (Fla.), Dec. 15, 2002, at IA (reporting
that the program, SmartJURY is "available to every lawyer in the nation for $995 a year").
By comparison, mock trials "can run... $20,000 a day." Live From. .. (CNN television
broadcast Feb. 16, 2005), supra note 42; see also Treger, supra note 26, at 566 ("Jury selec-
tion experts may charge as much as $200,000 for a single trial."); Streater, supra note 57
(discussing costs to retainjury consultants).
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tractive tool for practitioners, "[1]ittle legal precedent exists ... for
applying constitutional law to issues raised by computer-based infor-
mation systems."
5 9
This article fills the void by examining the "legal and ethical rami-
fications" 6° of introducing computer software into voir dire. It ad-
dresses whether software that considers race as one of several factors
to inform trial lawyers' determinations of efficient and effective use of
peremptory challenges survives constitutional scrutiny. Part II pro-
vides an overview of how the technology functions and assesses its ef-
ficacy. A two-fronted constitutional analysis follows. Part III analyzes
the issue through a discussion of both the Sixth6' and Fourteenth
Amendments by considering Batson v. Kentucky62 and its progeny. In
so doing, it contextualizes the Supreme Court's proscription on the
use of race-motivated decisions to exercise peremptory challenges.
Part IV introduces Grutter v. Bollinger63 into the foray and maintains its
relevance to voir dire in two ways: (1) the Court's diversity pro-
nouncements have far-reaching ramifications beyond the context of
university admissions; and (2) software calculations mirror university
admissions policies. By implicitly placing an imprimatur of constitu-
tionality upon any selection process-academic or otherwise-that
incorporates race as one criterion among many, Part V argues that
Grutter established a dangerous precedent under which software de-
signed for jury selection withstands constitutional challenge by cir-
cumventing and undermining the principles enunciated in Batson.
Software usage, permissible under Grutter, ultimately enables lawyers
to act with complete impunity when exercising peremptory chal-
lenges by concealing any racially motivated decision to exclude pro-
spective jurors.
59 OTA REPORT, supra note 52, at 22; see also Tresa Baldas, Computer Voir Dire, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 6, 2006, at I ("[L]awyers and legal experts ... worry about computer glitches and
constitutional challenges [to the use of computers in jury selection] involving ra-
cial... discrimination.").
60 See Baldas, supra note 59.
61 The Seventh Amendment, which pertains to jury trials in civil cases, is incorporated
within the discussion of the Sixth Amendment. See infra text accompanying notes 71-73.
62 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
63 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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II. THE NUTS AND BYrES OFJURY SELECTION SOFTWARE
Numerous jurisdictions throughout the United States utilize soft-
ware programs to generate jury pools. 64 Most systems currently in use
assist officials by determining eligibility or processing summons and
65do not directly relate to a juror's participation in any specific case.
Although trial lawyers often challenge the manner in which an entire
venire was summoned,66 the methods by which software generates
jury selection venires from which jurors are ultimately impaneled is
beyond the scope of this article. The software considered herein re-
lates specifically to retaining and eliminating prospective jurors who,
67
following the selection of a venire, are questioned during voir dire.
A. Establishing a Right to an Impartial jury in Both Civil and Criminal
Cases
Use of software during voir dire is applicable in both civil and
criminal cases.68 The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i] n all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed .... ,69 Civil litigants are guaran-
teed the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, which
provides that "[i]n Suits at common law,.. . the right of trial by jury
64 These programs incorporate "voter registration lists, phone books, and driver's license
records." 0. Drew Grice,Jr., Comment, J.E.B. v. Alabama: A CriticalAnalysis of the Supreme
Court's Latest Limitation on Peremptory Challenges, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 355, 356 n.5 (1995) (cit-
ing V. HALE STARR & MARK MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION §1.7, at 19-20 (2d ed. 1993)).
65 See, e.g., Kevin Cole, Douglas County Simplifies Jury Duty: Those Not Selected on the First Day Do
Not Have to Return, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Neb.), Oct. 7, 2006, at IA (noting the emer-
gence of an "e-Jury" system that enables jurors to answer summons online); Terry Dick-
son, New Jury List Will Resume Glynn Trials, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Aug. 31, 2000, at BI (dis-
cussing computerized systems specifically designed to select jury pools); Pamela Lehman,
Montco Makes Jury Selection Easier; Software Helps Determine Eligibility. Questions Put Online,
MORNING CALL (Pa.), Dec. 8, 2004, at B5 (discussing implementation of computer pro-
gram to manage prospective juror records).
66 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 16, at 1050 (discussing challenges to the manner of sum-
moning the entire venire rather than the method of selection after selection of the ve-
nire).
67 Cf Recent Cases, supra note 50, at 2678 (discussing Azania v. Indiana, 778 N.E.2d 1253
(Ind. 2002), wherein the Indiana Supreme Court held that computer programming er-
rors "violated Indiana's requirement of an 'impartial and random selection' process" by
excluding potential African American jurors from the overall jury selection pool).
68 See Baldas, supra note 59 ("Criminal and civil attorneys alike note that using computerized
statistical data to help detect a biased juror is a useful tool, especially when they have a
few peremptory strikes left and they don't know on which jurors to use them.").
69 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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shall be preserved. ... ,,70 Although the Seventh Amendment does
not explicitly state that a civil jury must, like its Sixth Amendment
counterpart, be impartial, courts have determined that "the right to a
jury trial in a civil case would be illusory unless it encompassed the
right to an impartial jury., 7' A "civil litigant's right to an impartial
jury inheres in the [S] eventh [A] mendment's preservation of a 'right
to trial by jury' and the [F]ifth [A]mendment's guarantee of due
process. '' 72  Because "the reasoning of the Sixth Amendment cases
concerning juror bias is germane to the analysis" for cases governed
by the Seventh Amendment, 73 this article focuses upon the Supreme
Court's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendmentjurisprudence.74
B. Defining the Purpose of Voir Dire
Jury trials "allow[] for the popular participation of society in de-
mocratic decision-making." 7  The selection of an impartial jury,
which ensures a fair trial, constitutes the primary goal of voir dire.
76
Although voir dire is "utilized in a strategic manner" by trial coun-
sel,77 its purpose, contrary to popular belief, is not "to impanel a jury
with a favorable attitude toward the client's case., 78 Rather, it is de-
signed to "eliminate those [individuals] who have particular bi-
ases.., that you think would be unfair. 7 9  Voir dire achieves two
70 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
71 Skaggs v. Otis Elevator Co., 164 F.3d 511, 514-15 (10th cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see
also Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1973) ("A defendant is entitled to a
fair trial, but not a perfect one, for there are no perfect trials." (quoting Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968))).
72 Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 F.2d 1532, 1535 n.4 (4th Cir. 1986) (emphasis
added).
73 Skaggs, 164 F.3d at 515 n.2 (citing McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464
U.S. 548 (1984)); see also Terry Kirkpatrick, Note, Gender-Based Peremptory Strikes: J.E.B. v.
Alabama Settles the Controversy, 33 U. LoUISVILLEJ. FAM. L. 143, 153 (1994-1995) ("[T]he
United States Constitution guarantees all citizens a trial before an impartial jury.").
74 See infra Part III.
75 Donna J. Meyer, A New Peremptory Inclusion to Increase Representativeness and Impartiality in
Jury Selection, 45 CASEW. RES. L. REv. 251, 251 (1994) (citations omitted).
76 See Harris v. Konteh, No. 04-4020, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 24114, at *25 (6th Cir. Sept. 21,
2006) ("It is likewise clear that the primary purpose of voir dire is to 'select an impartial
jury.'" (quoting Mu 'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991))).
77 Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and Pro-
posals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REv. 441,449 (1997); see supra Parts I.A-B.
78 Treger, supra note 26, at 560.
79 Symposium, Current Judicial Practice, Legal Issues and Existing Remedies, 40 AM. U. L. REV.
573, 580 (1991); see also McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554
(1984) ("Voir dire ... expos[es] possible biases, both known and unknown, on the part of
potential jurors."); Maj. Beth A. Townsend, Defending the "Indefensible": A Primer to Defend-
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purposess°: it (1) "elicit[s] information [that] establish[es] a basis for
challenges for cause";1 and (2) "facilitate[s] the intelligent use of
peremptory challenges. 8 2 With regard to the latter purpose, use of
peremptory challenges to eliminate potential jurors is permissible
"only where the Sixth and Seventh Amendment right of an impartial
jury afforded to an accused in the criminal context and a civil litigant,
respectively, outweighs the equal protection rights of the excluded
juror."
83
Because it is "virtually impossible for someone to be completely
objective in everything," lawyers seek to eliminate people from ajury
who would be "predisposed against their case. 84 In order "[t]o con-
duct adequate voir dire, attorneys must develop a set of detailed ques-
tions for jurors to explore their backgrounds and specific views.
'" 8 5
Eliminating jurors for cause requires counsel to "convince the court
that the challenged juror could not render an impartial verdict";
these strikes are usually directly related to specific answers elicited
from the juror.88 The process for detecting bias is considerably diffi-
cult when lawyers face time constraints for expeditiously impaneling a
jury.87
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Swain v. Alabama, the "es-
sential nature" of a peremptory challenge is that it is "exercised with-
out a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the
ing Allegations of Child Abuse, 45 A.F. L. REV. 261, 291 (1998) ("The purpose of voir dire is
to obtain information for the intelligent exercise of challenges") (citations omitted).
80 See Mu 'Min, 500 U.S. at 431 ("Voir dire serves the dual purposes of enabling the court to
select an impartial jury and assisting counsel in exercising peremptory challenges."); see
also Treger, supra note 26, at 551-52 ("[V]oir dire [provides] an opportunity for the at-
torneys and jurors to get to know each other, the chance to educate the venire about the
issues and relevant law applicable to the case, a way to minimize damaging facts in ad-
vance of trial, and a testing ground for counsel to explore tactical strategies.") (citations
omitted).
81 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 16, at 1050.
82 Id.
83 Robert T. Prior, The Peremptory Challenge: A Lost Cause?, 44 MERCER L. REV. 579, 595
(1993).
84 Streater, supra note 58.
85 Serio, supra note 14, at 1161.
86 See Prior, supra note 83, at 580 (discussing requirements for eliminating jurors for cause).
87 See David B. Graeven, Beware the Anxious Juror, PERSONAL INJURY VERDICr REVIEWS (LRP
Publications, Horsham, Pa.), Aug. 31, 1998 ("[P]roblems can arise in attempting to iden-
tify anxiousjurors.... This is often complicated when judges put time pressure on the at-
torneys to complete the jury selection process quickly."); see also Elaine A. Carlson, Bat-
son, J.E.B., and Beyond: The Paradoxical Quest for Reasoned Peremptory Strikes in the Jury
Selection Process, 46 BAYLOR L. REv. 947, 983 (1994) (suggesting that there might be a sup-
portable argument that due process violations exist because of "the denial of adequate
time to conduct voir dire").
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court's control."'  Consequently, peremptory challenges are often
exercised "in light of the limited knowledge counsel has" of prospective
jurors or "upon the sudden impressions and unaccountable preju-
dices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of an-
other, upon a juror's habits and associations. "' 9 Software, however, is
designed to eliminate arbitrary use of peremptory challenges by re-
vealing information about jurors who, because of lack of time, are not
directly questioned by counsel. 90 It thereby enables lawyers to "make
tough decisions when faced with the deadline pressures of voir
dire."9
C. Effectuating the Purpose of Voir Dire with Technology
The concept of software incorporates several elements designed
to generate profiles of ideal jurors.92 Use of an "ideal" juror enables
trial lawyers "to rank the juror on a scale for comparison to this
'ideal.' 93 In conjunction with consultants, lawyers develop juror pro-
files, determine what factors are relevant to the factual and legal cir-
cumstances underlying each case, and converge all data into a sys-
tematic platform to apply during voir dire. 
9 4
In many ways, the "innovative" software 5 streamlines this process.Armed with extensive information about each potential juror,96 the
88 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965), overruled in part by Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986).
89 Id. at 220-21 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
90 One software program's goal is "to obtain only a few-2 or 3 more desirable jurors in or-
der to change the outcome," rather than "to obtain a stacked jury." JuryQuest,
http://www.juryquest.com (last visited Aug. 12, 2007) (providing an overview of the soft-
ware and setting forth the software program's goals).
91 Baldas, supra note 59; see also Streater, supra note 58 ("[T]he software is merely a tool to
help attorneys organize thoughts and notes, collect public records and process the in-
formation fast enough to make good decisions.").
92 See James V. Grimaldi, Runaway Jury' Aside, Consultants Are a Fact of Life in Courtrooms,
WNASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2003, at E3 (discussing ways in which jury consultants identify jurors
likely to be favorable to their clients).
93 Covington, supra note 13, at 594. But see CBS Morning News (CBS television broadcast
Aug. 31, 2004) (discussing jury selection and noting that some prosecutors "develop a
profile of the ideal worstjuror that you want to get off") (emphasis added).
94 See Treger, supra note 26, at 562 (explaining the process involved in scientific jury selec-
tion).
95 See, e.g., Latest Legal Tool Helps Select Jurors Who Predictably Will Return Verdicts for
Clients, http://www.esquirelitigationsolutions.com/pr5lOO4_smartjury.htm (last visited
Sept. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Latest Legal Tool] ("This is the most innovative new software
for the legal field.").
96 See Computers & Scientiic Jury Selection, supra note 44, at 356 (predicting increased efforts
to collect juror information, contemplating "comprehensive womb-to-tomb dossiers," and
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software is an alternative to impaneling focus groups, devising survey-
based demographic statistics, and staging mock trials. 97 Although no
computer can "predict exactly what a juror will do if selected to de-
cide a case, 98 the software utilizes "mathematical formulas and atti-
tude scaling techniques"99 as well as "demographic profile [s] and ver-
bal and nonverbal clues"'00 to calculate the likelihood of a juror's
bias. A juror's profile is scored and ranked according to potential
bias-within one program, the scale ranges from "Ideal" to "Danger-
ous."'l ' Software determines a juror's demographic by analyzing an
individual's age, gender, race, level of education, occupation, marital
status, religious affiliation, income, and number of children. 2 An-
other competing product removes religion, number of children, and
income from its calculus but incorporates prior jury service. 1
03 Ulti-
mately, the software creates a thorough demographic survey of each
juror. 104
One of the software's most valuable features is its ability to "neatly
note not only demographic information but also an-
swer[] ... questions and observations of behavior that often get
lost." 0  Answers provided by jurors during voir dire are input into
the program and, together with the demographic information, pro-
noting potential privacy concerns); see also Streater, supra note 58 (explaining that the
software "will allow attorneys to have real-time access to public records"); Latest Legal
Tool, supra note 95 ("[The software] conducts a public records search ... that will pro-
duce information on each potential juror about criminal records, bankruptcies, liens and
judgments, business affiliations, real property ownership, web site domain names, average
income, education, and home value.").
97 See Jeff Horwitz, Jury-Rigging: Can a Computer Pick a Better Jury than a High-Priced Consult-
ant?, SLATE, Aug. 10, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2147351/ (comparing JuryQuest
jury selection software to earlier consultant-driven selection techniques).
98 Amie K Streater, Computer Technology Lets Lauyers Pick Jurors, SUN-SENTINEL (Fla.), Jan. 5,
2003, at 6B.
99 Horwitz, supra note 97.
100 Streater, supra note 58.
101 JuryQuest, supra note 90. A competing program allows lawyers to create their own rank-
ings to incorporate their own background and experiences while selecting the jury.
Adam Nelson, SmartJury, available at http://www.lawofficecomputing.com/EDC/
articles/review.php?year=2003&month=oct-nov&review-file=S&review-category-litigation
_support&reviewtitle=2003 (last visited Oct. 2, 2007).
102 See Bellisle, supra note 42 (describing factors jury selection software takes into account).
103 See Horwitz, supra note 97 (describing the factors JuryQuest software takes into account in
determining jurors' potential bias); see supra note 96 (discussing other information that
jury selection software can provide for users).
104 See Streater, supra note 58 (explaining the output ofjury selection software).
105 [d.
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duce a rating that indicates juror bias or neutrality."6 Although a
computer "is superior to someone trying to do this from the seat of
their pants,"' 7 creators of the software provide a caveat: "The lawyer
picks the jury, not the computer. But [the software] is extremely use-
ful." 108
D. Assessing the Efficacy of Technological Voir Dire
As researchers note, "the efficacy of psychological trial consulting
is an empirical question, to be answered as any other empirical ques-
tion would be-through controlled experimentation."'09  If success
rates were extremely high for selecting jurors "labeled acceptable by
social scientists, then trial by jury would cease to function impartially
and ultimately would have to be abandoned."' 0 Empirical data sug-
gests that scientific jury selection techniques could account for "be-
tween 5% and 15% of the variance in verdicts," potentially enhancing
a lawyer's ability to correctly classify jurors from 50% (completely
random) to 69%."' Nonetheless, ascertaining a success rate remains
"speculative, '' 1 2 and "there is good reason to be skeptical about the
potential of scientific jury selection to improve selection decisions
substantially." 113
Statistics for computerized jury selection tools may be more en-
couraging. One software program relies on demographic profiling
data from a national survey that has a statistical error factor of 2%
with a 95% level of confidence.'14 In the recent Andrea Yates trial,
106 Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 101 (discussing how SmartJury and JuryQuest
incorporate this information).
107 Streater, supra note 58; see supra text accompanying notes 22-23 (describing voir dire as a
guessing game).
108 Streater, supra note 57.
109 Stolle et al., supra note 44, at 143.
110 Jeremy W. Barber, Note, The Jury Is Still Out: The Role ofJuy Science in the Modern American
Courtroom, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1225, 1242 (1994) (quoting MichaelJ. Saks, Social Scien-
tists Can't Rig Juries, in IN THE JURY Box 48, 49 (Lawrence S. Wrightsman et al. eds.,
1987)).
111 See Stolle et al., supra note 44, at 144 (considering an argument by Solomon M. Fulero &
Steven D. Penrod, Attorney Jury Selection Folklore: What Do They Think and How Can Psycholo-
gists Help?, 3 FORENSIc REP. 233, 241 (1990)).
112 Treger, supra note 26, at 549.
113 Stolle et al., supra note 44, at 145 (citations omitted); see also Symposium, What Empirical
Research Tells Us, and What We Need to Know About Juries and the Quest for Impartiality, 40 AM.
U. L. REV. 547, 564 (1991) ("Even with all the tools at our disposal .... researchers cannot
always predict what individuals are going to do in a complex situation that has multiple
determinants.").
114 Latest Legal Tool, supra note 95.
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defense counsel used another software system that "rated seven Uu-
rors] as significantly biased in favor of the defendant before the trial
even began."" Ultimately, a "sympathetic"jury produced a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity." 6 Success rates for the software are
promising. Defense counsel using the software have prevailed in
about half "of the roughly 100 criminal trials in which the software
has been used.... far greater than the national average..... The soft-
ware developer touts further that, of those cases in which a jury re-
turned convictions, 80% of the panels returned lighter sentence rec-
ommendations than those sought by the prosecution."' Beyond that,
nearly 83% of civil litigants reportedly have prevailed utilizing the
software. " 9
Even if some argue that "it is foolish... [t]o have a lot of faith"'' 2°
in software, its use is expected to increase. Although scholars forecast
a rise in hung juries if both sides utilize the software, 12 1 many practi-
tioners say they "can't overemphasize the importance of the software
[which they see as] very valuable in [their] jury selection."'122 Justice
Breyer acknowledged that software is but one example of "a profes-
sional effort to fulfill the lawyer's obligation to help his or her cli-
ent.' 23 Nonetheless, the software "can be misused."'1 4 Justice Breyer
cautioned that any regime "that permits or encourages the use of
stereotypes work[s] at cross-purposes" with "the law's antidiscrimina-
tion command."'
12 5
III. THEJURY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTIONS ON RACE-BASED
DISCRIMINATION
Justice Breyer observed that use of racial stereotypes "in the jury-
selection process seems better organized and more systematized than
ever before.'1 6 In many ways, the technological advances that cre-
115 Horwitz, supra note 97.
116 Baldas, supra note 59, at 1.
117 Horwitz, supra note 97.
118 Id.; JuryQuest, supra note 90.
119 JuryQuest, Testimonials, http://www.juryquest.com/index.php?option=comcontent&
task=view&id=37&Itemid=69 (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
120 Horwitz, supra note 97.
121 See supra text accompanying note 110.
122 Baldas, supra note 59. But see Horwitz, supra note 97 ("[The software's] chief drawback
may well be its effect on an attorney's pride.").
123 Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 271 (2005) (BreyerJ., concurring).
124 Bellisle, supra note 42.
125 Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 271-72 (Breyer, J., concurring).
126 Id. at 270.
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ated jury selection software are akin to biological mutations that en-
able organisms to survive and to resist attack 121: it is "the direct result
of the successful treatment of earlier forms of the virus [of racial big-
otry] that has mutated in order to resist treatment."'1 2 Just as a series
of venire selection cases decided by the Supreme Court between 1880
and 1964 "provided the structural basis... to eliminate racism at the
peremptory challenge stage,"'2 9 software may foster a new era in
which the peremptory challenge can withstand exposure "as a reposi-
tory of the unexamined ... hatreds held by attorneys and their cli-
ents."' ° This Part considers the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudential principles affected by the introduction and use of
software during voir dire.
A. Charting the Path to the Peremptoiy Challenge Cases
The American "legacy of discrimination and segregation' 3'1 within
a society in which "race still matters"'' 32 predates the Declaration of
Independence.133  "Between 1777 and 1857, many northern states
abolished slavery and dismantled de jure impediments that denied
blacks access to the legal system" in the years that followed the Revo-' 34
lution. However, it was not until 1860 that African Americans were
127 Cf Abraham Abramovsky, Bias Crime: Is Parental Liability the Answer, 1992/1993 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 533, 540 (1993) ("Racial ... hatred is a disease which infects the social or-
der....").
128 Philip Bobbitt, Comment, Waging War Against Terror: An Essay for Sandy Levinson, 40 GA.
L. REv. 753, 762 (2006).
129 Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection and Jury Selection: Denying that Race Still
Matters, 1994 WiS. L. REV. 511, 530-31.
130 Raymond J. Broderick, Why Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369,
418 (1992).
131 Xavier de Souza Briggs & Margery Austin Turner, Assisted Housing Mobility and the Success
of Low-Income Minority Families: Lessons for Policy, Practice, and Future Research, 1 Nw. J. L. &
SOC. POL'Y 25, 37-38 (2006); see also Jeffrey J. Wallace, Ideology vs. Reality: The Myth of
Equal Opportunity in a Color Blind Society, 36 AKRON L. REV. 693, 705 (2003) ("Amer-
ica['s] ... long history of racism [and] discrimination [has been] firmly rooted in the
legacies of slavery, Jim Crowism, 'separate but equal,' and segregation.").
132 Cecil J. Hunt, II, The Color of Perspective: Affirmative Action and the Constitutional Rhetoric of
White Innocence, 11 MICH.J. RACE & L. 477, 533 (2006).
133 See generally William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of Slavery in British North America, 17
CARDOZO L. REv. 1711 (1996) (providing a thorough history of slavery in the original
British American colonies); see also Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law:
From the Cottonfield to the Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1, 13 (1995) (noting that slavery in
America was neither a "pre-planned [n] or organized process").
134 Broderick, supra note 130, at 375 (quoting LORENZOJ. GREENE, THE NEGRO IN COLONIAL
NEW ENGLAND 299 (1974)).
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believed to have first served on a jury. 135 "Racial inclusiveness on ju-
ries was a major constitutional and legislative issue" after the Civil
War 136 and, since the passage of the Reconstruction amendments,
"race has been a prominent topic of constitutional attention."'3' Be-
ginning with Strauder v. West Virginia,13 the Supreme Court ensured
that "[r] ace discrimination in jury selection [would constitute] a mat-
ter of constitutional concern.
'1
3
9
1. DeJure Statutory Exclusion Under Strauder
Strauder represents the first instance in which the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the "basic right of trial by an impartial jury"'' 40 under the
Sixth Amendment. The Court addressed the constitutionality of a
state statute providing for de jure exclusion of racial and ethnic mi-
norities from jury service 142: "[T]he first of these questions
is... whether, in the composition or selection of jurors .... all per-
sons of his race or color may be excluded by law, solely because of
their race or color, so that by no possibility can any colored man sit
upon the jury."143 The statute expressly denied individuals the "right
to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of
their color."144 The Court held that restriction from jury service on
the basis of race or color "amount[ed] to a denial of the equal pro-
tection of the laws" under the Fourteenth Amendment, which was
135 See James Forman, Jr., Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century, 113 YALE L.J. 895, 910
(2004) (expressing the notion that in both the North and the South no African Ameri-
cans served on any juries until 1860).
136 Id. at 897, 915 ("[D]iscrimination against black defendants was a significant Reconstruc-
tion concern.").
137 Donald E. Lively & Stephen Plass, Equal Protection: The Jurisprudence of Denial and Evasion,
40 AM. U. L. REV. 1307, 1316 n.46 (1991).
138 100 U.S. 303 (1879), overruled by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
139 Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination inJury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Any-
way, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 725 (1992).
140 John B. Ashby, Juror Selection and the Sixth Amendment Right to an Impartial Jury, 11
CREIGHTON L. REv. 1137, 1140 (1978).
141 Strauders reach extends, however, "to the composition of the venire and not the petit
jury." Barber, supra note 110, at 1228 n.16.
142 See Eric M. Albritton, Race-Conscious Grand Juror Selection: The Equal Protection Clause and
Strict Scrutiny, 31 AM.J. CRIM. L. 175, 176 (2003) (noting that the Court first addressed de
jure discrimination in Strauder). The state statute in question in Strauder provided: "All
white male persons who are twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of this State shall
be liable to serve as jurors.... " an instance of de jure discrimination. Strauder, 110 U.S.
at 305.
143 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305.
144 Id. at 308.
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enacted "to protect an emancipated race, and to strike down all pos-
sible legal discriminations against those who belong to it." 45 As was
recognized in later cases, the Court's holding made it clear that
"purposeful exclusion of blacks from jury participation because of
their race violates the equal protection clause."'
' 46
Strauder established the "principle that states could no longer pass
hostile and discriminating legislation against blacks, legislation sin-
gling out blacks and branding them with a stamp of 'inferiority."
'
1
47
As the first of "more than thirty cases involving Fourteenth Amend-
ment equal protection challenges to the selection of jury venires,"' 
8
Strauder provided "the foundation for the Court's unceasing efforts to
eradicate racial discrimination in the procedures used to select the
venire from which individual jurors are drawn."149 Still, Strauder never
explicitly established a right to a jury "of one's peers in a particular
case." 150  Rather, it only ensured that no "members of [the defen-
dant's] race [could be] purposefully excluded."' 5' Why the Court pro-
hibited race-based exclusion as opposed to requiring "inclusion to
guarantee a jury representative of one's racial peers is not evident.
The proposition is merely stated; no precedent is cited."'
1 2
2. De Facto and 'Other Causes' Exclusions Under Rives
Whatever "ray of hope" that Strauder may have represented 5' was
dimmed 5 4 by the Court's "restrict[ive] interpretation of it'' 55 in Vir-
145 Id. at 310.
146 Denise J. Arn, Batson: Beginning of the End of the Peremptory Challenge?, ARMY LAW., May
1990, at 35 (noting how the Court's holding in Strauder paved the way in other discrimi-
nation cases, such as Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)).
147 Jed Rubenfeld, The Paradigm-Case Method, 115 YALE LJ. 1977, 1988 (2006).
148 Brand, supra note 129, at 530.
149 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986).
150 Brand, supra note 129, at 541; see also Lisa M. Cox, Note, The "Tainted Decision-Making Ap-
proach": A Solution for the Mixed Messages Batson Gets from Employment Discrimination, 56
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 769, 773 (2006).
151 Deana Kim El-Mallawany, Johnson v. California and the Initial Assessment of Batson Claims,
74 FoRDHAm L. REV. 3333, 3338 (2006) (emphasis added).
152 Brand, supra note 129, at 542.
153 Strauder, considered in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, was "hardly adventurous."
Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 115, 136
(1994).
154 Richard L. Aynes, Unintended Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment and What They Tell Us
About its Interpretation, 39 AKRON L. REv. 289, 306 (2006).
155 Michael J. Desmond, Note, Limiting A Defendant's Peremptory Challenges: Georgia v.
McCollum and the Problematic Extension of Equal Protection, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 389, 400
(1993).
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r - 156
ginia v. Rives.156 Unlike the law at issue in Strauder,15 7 Virginia did not
enact a facially discriminatory statute precluding minorities from jury
service.158 Although Justice Strong "took the opportunity to reaffirm
in powerful language"'15 9 the Fourteenth Amendment's purpose "to
ma[ke] the rights and responsibilities, civil and criminal, of the two
races exactly the same," 160 the Court nonetheless refused to extend
Strauder's reach to recognize "a right to have the jury composed in
part of colored men."' 61 Rather, it determined that "[a] mixed jury in
a particular case is not essential to the equal protection of the laws,
and the right to it is not given by any law of Virginia, or by any Fed-
eral Statute. It is not, therefore, guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment ... . In so holding, the Court ignored allegations
that African Americans "had never been allowed to serve as jurors in
the court ... in any case in which a colored man was interested.'
63
The defendants in Rives only challenged a lack of African Ameri-
can presence on the jury rather than any intentional exclusion on the
basis of race. 164 Thus, no Fourteenth Amendment violation could be
sustained 16 because no state action precluded the impaneling of a ra-
cially diverse jury. 166 Any prejudices that may have operated to pro-
duce an all-white jury were, as Justice Field noted in concurrence,
outside the purview of the Equal Protection Clause:
156 100 U.S. 313 (1880), overruled on other grounds by Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808
(1966).
157 See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
158 The Court noted that "the laws of Virginia make no such discrimination ... by law against
the colored race, because of their color, in the selection ofjurors." Rives, 100 U.S. at 321.
The Virginia law provided that "'all male citizens, twenty-one years of age and not over
sixty, who are entitled to vote and hold office under the Constitution and laws of the
State,' with certain exemptions... may be jurors." Id. at 334 (Field, J., concurring).
159 McConnell, supra note 153, at 136.
160 Rives, 100 U.S. at 318.
161 Id. at 323; see alsojames H. Druff, The Cross-Section Requirement and Jury Impartiality, 73 CAL.
L. REv. 1555, 1564 n.43 (1985).
162 Rives, 100 U.S. at 323.
163 Id. at 322.
164 See id., 100 U.S. at 322 ("The assertions... fall short of showing that any civil right was
denied, or that there had been any discrimination against the defendants because of their
color or race. The.. .jury which indicted them ... may have been impartially se-
lected."); see also Robert William Rodriguez, Batson v. Kentucky: Equal Protection, The Fair
Cross-Section Requirement, and the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 37 EMoRY L.J.
755, 759 (1988).
165 Consequently, the "petition for a removal stated no facts that brought the case within the
provisions of this section, and, consequently, no jurisdiction of the case was acquired by
the Circuit Court of the United States." Rives, 100 U.S. at 323.
166 See id. at 320-23.
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There are many ways in which a person may be denied his
rights... [such as] from popular prejudices, passions, or excitement, bi-
assing [sic] the minds ofjurors and judges. Religious animosities, politi-
cal controversies, antagonisms of race, and a multitude of other causes
will always operate... as impediments to the full enjoyment and en-
forcement of civil rights. 
1 67
These "other causes" "left the Court trying to achieve the Fourteenth
Amendment's mandate without invading the sphere of private social
relations." 16 8 Thus, while the Court was "willing to invalidate facially
discriminatory criminal laws,"'' 69 it eschewed "reliev[ing African
Americans] from those obstacles in the enjoyment of their rights to
which all other persons are subject, and which grow out of popular
prejudices and passions."'7 ° As a result, Rives required that an ac-
cused establish that state officials' "adherence to a discriminatory
state statute" precluded African Americans from serving as jurors in
order to sustain an equal protection claim. 17' Rives "sent a message to
state legislators and administrators that a more subtle form of dis-
crimination, such as a facially neutral jury selection statute, would be
insulated from federal judicial review."
7 2
3. An Impossible Burden of Temporal Exclusion Under Neal
Following Strauder and Rives, with the latter case concluding that
evidence that non-whites had never served as jurors fell "short of
showing that any civil right was denied,''7" courts began "examin [ing]
specific fact situations to determine whether the state had denied a
minority defendant the protection guaranteed him by purposeful ex-
167 Id. at 332-33 (Field,J., concurring).
168 Developments in the Law--Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1479, 1486
(1988).
169 Id.
170 Rives, 100 U.S. at 333 (Field,J, concurring).
171 As the Court reasoned,
If, as was alleged in the argument, though it does not appear in the petition or re-
cord, the officer to whom was intrusted [sic] the selection of the persons from
whom the juries for the indictment and trial of the petitioners were drawn, disre-
garding the statute of the State, confined his selection to white persons, and refused to
select any persons of the colored race, solely because of their color, his action was
a gross violation of the spirit of the State's laws, as well as the [Civil Rights] act of
Congress of March 1, 1875, which prohibits and punishes such discrimination.
Id. at 321 (emphasis added).
172 Brand, supra note 129, at 543.
173 Rives, 100 U.S. at 322; see supra Part III.A.2.
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clu[sion of] his peers from thejury."'' 74 Neal v. Delaware175 provided "a
crucial step in the process by which [the Court] rendered itself impo-
tent concerning jury discrimination., 176 The Neal Court "engag[ed]
in historical sleight of hand"177 to reverse a defendant's conviction 7
while simultaneously deciding to deny a request for removal to fed-
eral court. 179  Although Delaware's statutes and constitution "re-
strict[ed] the selection of jurors to white male citizens, being voters,
and sober and judicious persons,"1 80 the Court nonetheless deter-
mined that no facially discriminatory statute was implicated because
its exclusionary provisions were superseded by the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, enacted later than the Delaware constitu-
tion.1 8 ' Thus, it found that Delaware's failure to enact legislation con-
flicting with the amendments did not constitute a denial of equal
protection or civil rights warranting federal court jurisdiction.8 2  Its
conclusion provided the Court with an opportunity to grant "uncon-
sidered affirmation" 8 3 of Rives and greater latitude to refine the stan-
dards for race-based juror exclusion enunciated in Strauder. 1s,
The Neal Court ultimately held that a petitioner can demonstrate
a prima facie equal protection violation upon a showing that African
Americans were wholly precluded from jury service over an extended
174 Michael E. Starr, Comment, Race Discrimination and the Use of Peremptory Challenges: Is Bat-
son v. Kentucky the Sole Motivating Factor for Texas Law?, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 161, 163
(1989).
175 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
176 Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination: The Lost Promise of
Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1456 (1983).
177 Brand, supra note 129, at 545.
178 The defendant was deprived of an opportunity to present evidence in support of his ar-
gument that African Americans were completely eliminated from jury selection. Neal, 103
U.S. at 394; see also Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Ine-
quality, and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2469 (2003).
179 See generally Neal, 103 U.S. 370.
180 Id. at 388.
181 See id. Although Delaware "had never, by a convention, or popular vote, formally abro-
gated the provision in its State Constitution restricting suffrage to white citizens [the pro-
visions were nullified] as a matter of law, from the incorporation of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments into the fundamental law of the nation." Id. at 389. Thus, the
federal constitutional amendments "render[ed] inoperative, that provision which restricts
the right of suffrage to the white race." Id. Consequently, Delaware's statute prescribing
"qualifications ofjurors was, itself, enlarged in its operation, so as to embrace all who by
the State Constitution, as modified by the supreme law of the land, were qualified to vote
at a general election." Id.
182 Id. at 392.
183 Schmidt, supra note 176, at 1456.
184 See Stephen R. DiPrima, Note, Selecting a Jury in Federal Criminal Trials After Batson and
McCollum, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 888,899 (1995).
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time period.1i 5  It noted that the state "conceded in argu-
ment... [t]hat colored persons have always been excluded from ju-
ries in the courts of Delaware"186 and that "citizens of the African
race, qualified in all respects to serve as jurors, were excluded from
the panels, because of their race."87 The Court's holding, however,
revealed two interwoven elements related to the conduct of state offi-
cials. First, the Court enunciated a temporal aspect to discriminatory
conduct on the part of state officers, "whose job it was to secure ju-
rors in a non-discriminatory fashion"88 :
It was, we think, under all the circumstances, a violent presumption
which the State court indulged, that such uniform exclusion of that race
from juries, during a period of many years, was solely because, in the
judgment of those officers, fairly exercised, the black race in Delaware
were utterly disqualified."'
Second, the Court "required a showing of discriminatory purpose as a
predicate for finding wrongful exclusion"6 0 : "Whoever, by virtue of
public position under a State government, deprives another of prop-
erty, life, or liberty without due process of law, or denies or takes away
the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibi-
tion."191
The Court placed the burden of proving discrimination upon the
petitioner. 192 Such a "serious burden"1 93 would not shift to the state
185 Neal, 103 U.S. at 397. A prima facie violation existed where "no colored citizen had ever
been summoned as a juror in the courts of the State, -although its colored population
exceeded twenty thousand in 1870, and in 1880 exceeded twenty-six thousand, in a total
population of less than one hundred and fifty thousand." Id.
186 Id. at 393 (emphasis added).
187 Id.
188 Joshua E. Swift, Note, Batson's Invidious Legacy: DiscriminatoryJuror Exclusion and the "Intui-
tive" Peremptory Challenge, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 336, 342 n.48 (1993).
189 Neal, 103 U.S. at 397.
190 Brand, supra note 129, at 546 (emphasis added).
191 Neal, 103 U.S. at 397. The lower court's own conduct, which reflected "the state of mind
of the state official," was dispositive in prompting reversal. Id. at 393-94. The Chief Jus-
tice of the Delaware court remarked on the record that "the great body of black men re-
siding in this State are utterly unqualified by want of intelligence, experience, or moral
integrity to sit onjuries." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
192 The Court stated:
[I]t would be wholly unwarranted in us to infer.., a purpose to do otherwise than
perform [a court's] duty by the selection of 'sober and judicious' persons to serve
upon the juries, as the law requires, [and] would be a wrong on our part upon the
well-known principle that, in the absence of proof to the contrary, a public officer,
discharging an official obligation or function, is to be presumed to have done it
faithfully according to law. It also seems to me plain that the court below properly
refused to accept as true ... the unsupported statements of a party....
Id. at 402-03.
193 Schmidt, supra note 176, at 1458.
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for another fifty-five years.' 94  Consequently, the Neal Court articu-
lated "an almost impossible evidentiary standard for proving inten-
tional discrimination and establishing an equal protection viola-
tion,"'9 5 virtually requiring a petitioner to "delve into the state of
mind of the state official."'
96
4. Systematic Venire Exclusion Proscriptions Under Norris
Although Strauder, Rives, and Neal "ostensibly vindicated black
rights, they had little effect on the racial composition of juries. In
subsequent cases, the Court either found no evidence of intent or
shut its eyes to such evidence." 97 Moreover, these cases failed to pro-
duce any tangible progress "for most of the next century, [as] a state's
racially exclusionary practices during jury selection became virtually
immune from federal statutory or constitutional challenge."'1 9 Such a
phenomenon resulted, in part, "because of the history of Southern
(and national) racism in the century following the Civil War. The
combined effects of culture, economics, racist ideology, revanchism,
inertia, and politics simply overwhelmed any influence of the Court's
pronouncements."'' 99  Slight progress, however, was reached in the
1935 decision Norris v. Alabama.0 °
Norris, which stemmed from the infamous "Scottsboro Boys"201
case and a previous Supreme Court decision overturning convic-
tions by recognizing a constitutional right to appointed counsel,
0 2
"was no different from the Court's pronouncement fifty-five years ear-
lier" in Neal.20 3 Whereas the Rives Court had dismissed allegations of
historical exclusion in order to bypass finding denial of a federal
194 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
195 Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against
the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 65 (1990).
196 Brand, supra note 129, at 546.
197 Vada Burger et al., Comment, Too Much Justice: A Legislative Response to McCleskey v.
Kemp, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 437, 446 (1989).
198 Colbert, supra note 195, at 65.
199 Marvin Zalman & Olga Tsoudis, Plucking Weeds from the Garden: Lawyers Speak About Voir
Dire, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 163, 397 (2005).
200 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
201 See generally DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1979) (re-
counting the cases of nine African Americans falsely accused of raping two Caucasian
women on a train, eight of whom were sentenced to death).
202 Powell v. Alabama, 278 U.S. 45 (1932); see also Victor L. Streib, Would You Lie to Save Your
Client's Life? Ethics and Effectiveness in Defending Against Death, 42 BRANDEIS LJ. 405, 412
(2003).
203 Brand, supranote 129, at 551.
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right, 20 4 the Norris Court addressed the issue directly: "[I]t is our
province to inquire not merely whether it was denied in express
terms but also whether it was denied in substance and effect. 2 0 5 As
such, it assessed the constitutionality of excluding African Americans
from jury service based, in large part, upon testimony by the county
jury commissioner, who explained that no African American quali-
fied for service under the Alabama statute. °6
Exhibiting a "willingness to review meaningfully the factual record
of the state court,, 217 the Court recounted that no African American
had served on a grand or petit jury in "the entire history" of the
county in which the defendant was tried.0 8 Citing Neal, it established
that it "would make an independent inquiry into whether a particular
state's jury qualifications amount to purposeful discrimination."2°'
The Court concluded that "long-continued, unvarying, and wholesale
exclusion of negroes from jury service... find[s] no justification con-
sistent with the constitutional mandate. ,2 10 Thus, the Court held that
the defendant had established a prima facie case of an equal protec-
21121tion violation and overturned his conviction,2  thereby "suc-
ceed[ing] in reversing the trend set by the Court in the first phase of
the venire selection cases.,
21 3
204 See supra Part III.A.2.
205 Norris, 294 U.S. at 590.
206 Id. at 598-99. The jury commissioner stated he knew of no African American in the
county:
who is generally reputed to be honest and intelligent and who is esteemed in the
community for his integrity, good character and sound judgment, who is not an
habitual drunkard, who isn't afflicted with a permanent disease or physical weak-
ness which would render him unfit to discharge the duties of ajuror, and who can
read English, and who has never been convicted of a crime involving moral turpi-
tude.
Id.
207 Brand, supra note 129, at 551.
208 Norris, 294 U.S. at 591. The Court cited testimony suggesting that:
no negro had served on any grand or petit jury in that county within the memory
of witnesses who had lived there all their lives .... The clerk of the jury commis-
sion and the clerk of the circuit court had never known of a negro serving on a
grand jury .... [Moreover, t]he court reporter, who had not missed a session in
that county in twenty-four years, and two jury commissioners testified to the same
effect.
Id.
209 Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64
U. CHI. L. REv. 809,831 (1997).
210 Norris, 294 U.S. at 597.
211 Id. at 591.
212 Id. at 599.
213 Brand, supra note 129, at 551.
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The Norris Court embraced the use of "statistical evidence to
demonstrate disproportionate underepresentation of African-
Americans on jury venires, '2 14 for which "abundant evidence" demon-
strated that a "large number" of qualified African Americans had
been excluded.2 15 The so-called "rule of exclusion," for which Norris
stands, 16 "eased the evidentiary burden for establishing a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination. 2 1' 7 Norris shifted the burden to the
state to prove nondiscriminatory justifications for exclusions such as
"statistical disparity resulted from accident, or from the fact that no
sufficiently qualified African-Americans were on the lists from which
the venires were established., 21 8  The state, with its reliance upon
"sweeping characterization [s] ''219 contained in the county jury com-
missioner's testimony,20 "failed to rebut the strong prima facie case
which defendant had made" by presenting "mere generalities."
22'
B. Challenging the Peremptory Challenge
Although Strauder created the "impetus for restricting modern-day
peremptory challenges,"2 2  the Court, following Neal and preceding
Norris, "sat on its hands for the next half century" 223 and virtually
"winked at widespread exclusions of blacks from juries.,,224  Norris,
however, began a trend in which defendants presented "proof of
long-term near-total exclusion of blacks from jury venires coupled
214 Id. at 552; see also Nonis, 294 U.S. at 597 (noting that evidence was presented that "for
many years no negro had been called forjury service itself tended to show the absence of
the names of negroes from the jury rolls, and the State made no effort to prove their
presence").
215 Norris, 294 U.S. at 597.
216 See Thomas A. Saenz, Mendez and the Legacy of Brown: A Latino Civil Rights Lawyer's As-
sessment, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 395, 399 (2004) ("[1]n 1935, in Norris v. Alabama, the
United States Supreme Court adopted the 'rule of exclusion'. ).
217 Colbert, supra note 195, at 83.
218 Brand, supra note 129, at 552.
219 Norris, 294 U.S. at 599.
220 See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
221 Norris, 294 U.S. at 598. The Court added that if "the mere general assertions by officials
of their performance of duty were to be accepted as an adequate justification for the
complete exclusion of negroes from jury service, the constitutional provision-adopted
with special reference to their protection-would be but a vain and illusory requirement."
Id.
222 John J. Neal, Note, Striking Batson Gold at the End of the Rainbow?: Revisiting Batson v. Ken-
tucky and Its Progeny in Light ofRomer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas, 91 IOWA L. REV.
1091, 1098 (2006).
223 Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARv. L. REV. 26, 71 n.148
(2000).
224 Id. at 71.
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with a statistical demonstration of their availability to serve."'2 5 Al-
though it may have "represented a constitutional leap forward in suc-
cessfully challenging and modifying state selection procedures,,
26
Norris failed to provide guidance in cases in which race-based exclu-
sions were "less extreme. 2 27 In fact, Norris "forced many states to use
more subtle means of excluding blacks from jury service. ,221 Prosecu-
tors' increasing use of peremptory challenges "provided an all too ef-
fective means of effecting racial discrimination in jury selection
through the mid-twentieth century, 229 by ensuring that African
Americans would remain precluded from serving as jurors despite
their inclusion injury pools.
2 30
1. The Nature of the Peremptory Challenge
"Impartiality," Chief Justice Hughes stated in United States v.
Wood, 1 "is not a technical conception. It is a state of mind. For the
ascertainment of this mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the
Constitution lays down no particular tests and procedure is not
chained to any ancient and artificial formula. 23 2  Similarly absent
from the Constitution is reference to the peremptory challenge,233
"one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused.9234
The peremptory challenge "has very old credentials,"'' 5 with its origin
225 Brand, supra note 129, at 553.
226 Colbert, supra note 195, at 83.
227 DiPrima, supra note 184, at 906.
228 Brand, supra note 129, at 564.
229 Barat S. McClain, Note & Comment, Turner's Acceptance of Limited Voir Dire Renders Bat-
son 's Equal Protection a Hollow Promise, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 273, 278 (1989).
230 "[P]eremptory striking of prospective black jurors simply replaced the jury commis-
sioner's arbitrary disqualification of eligible black citizens to become the primary means
for retaining the 'whites-only'jury." Colbert, supra note 195, at 93.
231 299 U.S. 123 (1936).
232 Id. at 145-46.
233 See Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) ("There is nothing in the Constitu-
tion of the United States which requires the Congress to grant peremptory challenges to
defendants in criminal cases.").
234 Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894).
235 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965).
[Vol. 10:1
WHEN BATSON MET GRUTER
dating to medieval England 23 6 and its introduction into the American
legal system as part of the common law.237
The peremptory challenge is "not of itself a right to select, but a
right to rejectjurors.
238 As Justice Field noted in Hayes v. Missouri,
239
if, after the exercise of peremptory challenges, "those who remain
[constitute] an impartial jury," then "the constitutional right of the
accused is maintained. 2 40 Impartiality, added Justice Frankfurter, "is
an essential manifestation of its reality,, 241 and peremptory challenges
are implicitly derived from within the Sixth Amendment right provid-
ing for trial of criminal defendants by an impartial jury.242
The "essential nature" of a peremptory challenge, once referred
to by the Supreme Court as "an arbitrary and capricious right,"243 is its
exercise "without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being
subject to the court's control. 2 4  Its functions are numerous. First, it
impresses upon litigants that the jury system is an appropriate
mechanism for resolving disputes. 45 Second, it avoids "trafficking in
the core of truth in most stereotypes, 246 by "assur[ing] the parties that
the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of
the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise.2 47  Third, it
"shield[s] ... the exercise of the challenge for cause, 24 8 by "eliminat-
236 See William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Jury Selection Errors on Appeal, 38 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1391, 1412 (2001). Scholars have promulgated several theories explaining the de-
velopment of the peremptory challenge. See generallyJ. ShontaviaJackson, Comment, Per-
emptory Challenge: Striking Down Discrimination in Arkansas's Jury Selection Process, 59 ARK. L.
REv. 93,98 (2006).
237 Cynthia Richers-Royland, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: The New and Improved Peremptory Chal
lenge, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1195, 1198 (1987). In Swain, the Court noted that "peremptories
were and are freely used and relied upon in this country, perhaps because juries here are
drawn from a greater cross section of a heterogeneous society." 380 U.S. at 218.
238 United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. 480, 482 (1827).
239 120 U.S. 68 (1887).
240 Id. at 71.
241 Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 182 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
242 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Alice Biedenbender, Holland v. Illinois: A Sixth Amend-
ment Attack on the Use of Discriminatory Peremptory Challenges, 40 CATH. U. L. REv. 651, 653
(1991).
243 Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892).
244 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
245 See Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power, "27 STAN L. REV. 545,
552 (1975) (discussing the role of preemptory challenges). Justice Scalia has argued that
peremptory challenges "enable the defendant to correct judicial error" on questions of
juror bias. United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 319 (2000) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring).
246 Babcock, supra note 245, at 553.
247 Swain, 380 U.S. at 219.
248 Babcock, supra note 245, at 554.
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ing bias that a challenge-for-cause would be unable to detect."49 Al-
though a growing number of scholars and judges advocate proscrib-
ing use of peremptory challenges, 5° this article takes no position on
either their efficacy or vitality in the American jurisprudential system.
2. Upholding the Practice Under Swain
The Court did not address states' efforts to implement "more sub-
tle means of exclusion, 25 after Norris until 1965, when it affirmed the
use of peremptory challenges to strike African American jurors in
Swain v. Alabama.252  First, the Court rejected the petitioner's chal-
lenge of Alabama's jury selection procedures, citing Rives for the
proposition that a "defendant in a criminal case is not constitution-
ally entitled to demand a proportionate number of his race on the
jury which tries him nor on the venire or jury roll from which petit
jurors are drawn.' Unlike the wholesale exclusion of African
Americans that the Court addressed in Strauder, it concluded that
Alabama's process, though "somewhat haphazard [and replete with]
little effort.., made to ensure that all groups in the community were
fully represented,"'1 54 did not produce a disparity sufficient enough to
establish a prima facie case of an equal protection violation.
255
249 Mark Sabel, The Role of Stare Decisis in Construing the Alabama Constitution of 1901, 53 ALA.
L. REv. 273, 282 (2001).
250 One of the most vocal opponents was Justice Marshall, who noted that the Court's juris-
prudence "will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-
selection process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory chal-
lenges entirely." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring); see also Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, The Peremptoy Challenge, and the Jury, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 1683, 1715 (2006) ("The elimination of the peremptory should be the
next step. This would end the discrimination during jury selection that has persisted un-
der Batson.").
251 Brand, supra note 129, at 564; see also Brand, supra, at 564-66 (offering possible reasons
for the interstice between Norris and the Court's decision to review peremptory chal-
lenges in Swain).
252 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
253 Id. at 208.
254 Id. at 209. Although the Court maintained that it was "wholly obvious that Alabama has
not totally excluded a racial group from either grand or petit jury panels," it nonetheless
acknowledged that "no negro has actually served on a petit jury since about 1950." Id. at
205-06.
255 See id. at 209 ("But an imperfect system is not equivalent to purposeful discrimination
based on race. We do not think that the burden of proof was carried by petitioner in this
case." (footnote omitted)); Symposium, To Kill a Mockingbird, 45 ALA. L. REV. 403, 434
(1994).
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Next, the Swain Court turned to "the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude Negroes from serving on petit juries, 25 6 marking
the "first time the Supreme Court addressed the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges and the difficult task of balancing Equal Pro-
tection claims against the rationale behind the peremptory challenge
system. 25 7  Although "[r] ace-based peremptories were actually un-
constitutional" after Strauder, Swain made them "virtually impossible
to prove.,, 258 Noting that voir dire "tends to be extensive and prob-
ing,, 259 the Court reviewed "the credentials and purposes of peremp-
tories. 260 Explaining that peremptory challenges are often based on
"sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to
conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another," the Court
then acknowledged that peremptory challenges are "no less fre-
quently exercised on grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal
proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality,
occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty., 2 61 It re-
fused to undermine the sanctity of the peremptory challenge by sub-
262
jecting any underlying motivations for its use to scrutiny
To subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particular case to the de-
mands and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause would
entail a radical change in the nature and operation of the challenge.
The challenge, pro tanto, would no longer be peremptory, each and every
263
challenge being open to examination ....
Consequently, the majority concluded, the Court "cannot hold that
the Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons
for the exercise of his challenges in any given case. ''zb4
256 Swain, 380 U.S. at 209.
257 Arielle Siebert, Batson v. Kentucky: Application to Whites and the Effect on the Peremptory
Challenge System, 32 COLUM.J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 307, 312 (1999).
258 Daniel M. Hinkle, Peremptory Challenges Based on Religious Affiliation: Are They Constitu-
tional?, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 139, 144 n.35 (2005); see infra notes 285 & 290-300 and ac-
companying text.
259 Swain, 380 U.S. at 218-19.
260 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 16, at 1061.
261 Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
262 See, e.g., Robert G. Loewy, Note, WhenJurors Lie: Differing Standards for New Trials, 22 AM.J.
CRIM. L. 733, 748 (1995) (noting that "[a
n y act that compromises peremptory challenges
will diminish the public's confidence in the ability of the state to administer justice").
263 Swain, 380 U.S. at 221-22.
264 Id. at 222. In fact, the Court noted that the state was accorded a good-faith presumption
that its uses of peremptory challenges were solely to effectuate the purposes underlying
the Sixth Amendment. Id. Such a presumption "is not overcome and the prosecutor
therefore subjected to examination by allegations that in the case at hand all Negroes
were removed from the jury or that they were removed because they were Negroes." Id.
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By preserving the practice of peremptory challenges,265 the Court
"set a high standard of proof before it would consider an Equal Pro-
tection claim.,1 66 Acknowledging that the state may not employ per-
emptory challenges to strike African American jurors "for reasons
wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on trial," 67 the
Court accorded the state "a presumption that the prosecutor consti-
tutionally exercised her challenges to achieve a fair and impartial
jury. 268 Although a rebuttable presumption, the burden rested upon
defendants269 to produce "evidence... of what the prosecution did or
did not do on its own account in any cases other than the one at
bar. 2 76  Thus, petitioners must, in order to state a prima facie equal
protection violation, "show [a] pattern of discrimination, 27 1 by alleg-
ing prosecutorial misconduct in prior cases wherein "the prosecutor
used his strikes to remove Negroes"27 2:
[A] showing that negroes have not served during a specific period of
time does not, absent a sufficient showing of the prosecutor's participa-
tion, give rise to the inference of systematic discrimination .... The or-
dinary exercise of challenges by defense counsel does not, of course, im-
273ply purposeful discrimination by state officials.
Because the Court required that a "defendant must, to pose the issue,
show the prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory challenges
against Negroes over a period of time," Swain erected "additional
barriers to the elimination of jury discrimination practices2 74 by im-
265 Relying upon the historical practice of the challenge itself, the Court effectively held "for
the first time that preemptory challenges are not entirely preemptory." Pizzi & Hoffman,
supra note 236, at 1439.
266 Siebert, supra note 257, at 312.
267 Swain, 380 U.S. at 224. The peremptory challenge may not "deny the Negro the same
right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the white
population." Id. But see id. at 220-21 (noting that race, though a "frequently exercised"
ground upon which peremptory challenges are exercised, is "normally thought irrelevant
to legal proceedings or official action"). Thus, "although the Court technically held that
purposeful racial discrimination in jury selection was violative of equal protection, it se-
verely limited a party's ability to support such a finding." David Smith & Rachel Den-
nehy, Note, Controversy over the Peremptory Challenge: Should Batson Be Expanded?, 10 ST.
JOHN'SJ.L. COMM. 453, 458 n.28 (1995).
268 Rodriguez, supra note 164, at 757.
269 "Petitioner has the burden of proof and he has failed to carry it." Swain, 380 U.S. at 226.
But see id. at 238 (Goldberg,J., dissenting) (stating that "it seems clear that petitioner has
affirmatively proved a pattern of racial discrimination in which the State is significantly
involved, or for which the State is responsible").
270 Id. at 225.
271 Smith & Dennehy, supra note 267, at 458 n.27.
272 Swain, 380 U.S. at 226.
273 Id. at 227.
274 Id. at 231 (Goldberg,J., dissenting).
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posing upon defendants "a crippling burden of proof"'2 75 wherein
"prosecutors' peremptory challenges [were] now largely immune
from constitutional scrutiny."
2 76
3. Articulating a New Standard Under Batson
In at least two post-Swain cases, federal courts endeavored to cir-
cumvent Swain's stringent burden by invoking the Sixth Amendment
to proscribe racially discriminatory uses of peremptory challenges. 77
Most courts, however, refused to follow the approach, 78 opting in-
stead to preserve "an unworkable ... precedent that was inconsistent
with intervening major developments in the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence.,279  The Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky,2 80 how-
ever, "eviscerated the heart" of Swain,8" a case once the "subject of
extensive commentary" 82 that today is "routinely mentioned in pass-
ing.,,283
Batson "is a classic example of the Supreme Court's overruling a
well-established, twenty-one year old precedent grounded in constitu-
tional law., 284  The Court "reexamined... the evidentiary burden
placed on a criminal defendant who claims that he has been denied
equal protection through the State's use of peremptory challenges to
275 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986). The burden has also been characterized as
"insurmountable," which prompted many states to develop "alternative tests to Swain."
Rodriguez, supra note 164, at 757.
276 Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93; see also id. at 103 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Misuse of the per-
emptory challenge to exclude black jurors has become both common and flagrant.").
277 Booker v.Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001, affd on reconsideration,
801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046 (1987); McCray v. Abrams, 750
F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986). Petitioner in Batson unsuccess-
fully urged the Supreme Court of Kentucky to follow precedent in California and Massa-
chusetts wherein courts determined that prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges to
exclude prospective jurors on the basis of race constituted a Sixth Amendment violation.
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 84 (citing People v. Wheller, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978) and Com-
monwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499 (Mass. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979)).
278 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 82 n.1 (1986) (citing cases "adhering to the requirement that a de-
fendant must prove systematic exclusion of blacks from the petit jury to establish a consti-
tutional violation"); see also Stephen I. Shaw, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: The Court's Re-
sponse to the Problem of Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
581, 593 (1986) (noting that "deviations from Swain prior to Batson had been rare").
279 Sabel, supra note 249, at 282.
280 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
281 Jill E. Evans, Challenging the Racism in Environmental Racism: Redefining the Concept of Intent,
40 ARiz. L. REv. 1219, 1293 n.392 (1998).
282 Batson, 476 U.S. at 90 n.14.
283 Brand, supra note 129, at 566.
284 Sabel, supra note 249, at 284.
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exclude members of his own race from the petit jury.",2 5 Although it
acknowledged that "decisions of this Court have been concerned
largely with discrimination during selection of the venire,'' 2" 6 the Bat-
son Court "extended the Fourteenth Amendment prohibition of ra-
cially discriminatory jury selection practices from the venire context
to the petit jury. ' 287 First, the Court broadly asserted that "harm from
discriminatory jury selection" in toto, rather than separating venire
from petit jury selection conduct, "extends beyond that inflicted on
the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire commu-
nity. ,21 Second, it invoked "standards that have been developed
since Swain for assessing a prima facie case under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. 289
With regard to the latter, and in recognition that Swain's "crip-
pling burden of proof' insulated prosecutorial uses of peremptory
challenges from constitutional scrutiny,290 the Court "focused on the
evidentiary burden required of a defendant making a claim of pur-
poseful discrimination." 29' First, it reaffirmed "the general equal pro-
tection principle that the 'invidious quality' of governmental action
claimed to be racially discriminatory 'must ultimately be traced to a
racially discriminatory purpose. ' ' ' 92  Proof of invidious intent, the
Court reasoned, could be proven circumstantially by a showing of
disproportionate impact.
2 93
Second, the Court emphasized that a "totality of relevant facts
gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. 2 9 4 Such facts
need not be inferred by systematic discriminatory use of peremptory
285 Batson, 476 U.S. at 82.
286 Id. at 88 (emphasis added).
287 Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 168, 170 (1990) (emphasis added). Justice Powell wrote:
"[T]he principles announced [in venire cases] also forbid discrimination on account of
race in selection of the petitjury." Batson, 476 U.S. at 88.
288 Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
289 Id. at 93.
290 Id. at 92-93.
291 Richers-Royland, supra note 237, at 1207.
292 Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976)). Discrimi-
natory purpose, the Court has stated, "implies more than intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision-maker ... selected or reaffirmed
a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its ad-
verse effects upon an identifiable group." Personal Administrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
293 Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (citing Davis, 426 U.S. at 242).
294 Id. at 94 (citing Davis, 426 U.S. at 239-42); see infra note 295.
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challenges over a period of time, as required by Swain. 95 Rather, the
Court recognized that a prima facie case of discrimination could be
established "'in other ways than by evidence of long-continued unex-
plained absence' of members of [a particular] race 'from many pan-
els.' 296 In fact, such recognition existed before Swain.97 Batson, how-
ever, elevated that recognition into binding authority, eliminating
Swain's requirement that defendants "demonstrate a pattern of dis-
crimination in prior cases.,298 Under Batson, a defendant could estab-
lish purposeful racial discrimination "solely on the facts concern-
ing [] selection in his case,, 299 a practice the Court borrowed from its
Title VII "disparate treatment" jurisprudence.300
To that end, Batson coalesced prior case law so' into a "three-
prong '2 0 2 "evidentiary test"3 0 3 a defendant must satisfy in order to state
a prima facie case of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges°4 :
(1) establish membership in a "cognizable racial group; '3°5 (2) assert
that prosecutorial exercise of peremptory challenges removed venire
295 Circumstantial evidence, however, need not constitute proof that "the prosecutor trying
his case had consistently excluded blacks from petit juries in a number of cases." Michael
W. Kirk, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments-The Swain Song of the Racially Discriminatory Use of
Peremptory Challenges, 77J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 821, 830 (1986). A prosecutor's "'pat-
tern' of strikes against black jurors as well as his or her questions and statements during
voir dire would be relevant circumstancial evidence of discriminatory purpose." Brand,
supra note 129, at 576.
296 Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 (quoting Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 290 (1950) (plurality opin-
ion)).
297 Cassell, as a plurality opinion, constituted only authoritative precedent. See Sara L. Rose,
Comment, "Cruel and Unusual Punishment" Need Not Be Cruel, Unusual, or Punishment, 24
CAP. U. L. REv. 827, 843 (noting how plurality opinions are not binding authority). It was
not binding authority. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 736 (1983) (plurality opinion)
("While not a binding precedent, as the considered opinion of four Members of this
Court it should obviously be the point of reference for further discussion of the issue.").
298 Mattie Johnstone & Joshua M. Zachariah, Peremptory Challenges and Racial Discrimination:
The Effects of Miller-El v. Cockrell, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 863, 867 (2004) (emphasis
added).
299 Batson, 476 U.S. at 95.
300 Id. at 96 n.19. For background on the Court's "disparate treatment" jurisprudence, see
generally U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); Tex. Dept. of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973).
301 Batson, 476 U.S. at 94-95.
302 Cheryl A.C. Brown, Challenging the Challenge: Twelve Years After Batson, Courts Are Still
Struggling to Fill in the Gaps Left by the Supreme Court, 28 U. BALT. L. REv. 379, 402 (1999).
303 Kirk, supra note 295, at 831.
304 But see DiPrima, supra note 184, at 904 (stating that federal district court judges frequently
"by-pass the prima facie stage of Batson analysis").
305 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
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members who themselves belong to that racial group;mo and (3) show
"facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that
the prosecutor used [peremptory challenges] to exclude the venire-
men from the petit jury on account of their race.",3 7 With respect to
the first and second elements, Batson never addressed what consti-
tuted a "cognizable racial group" and whether its protections ex-
tended only to prospective jurors who identified with that same308
group. As to the third element, the Court remained "confiden[t]"
that a trial court was duly capable of discerning whether a prima facie
cases had been presented.3 9
A prima facie showing of discrimination constitutes the first of a
"three-step burden-shifting framework 3 10 that comprised Batson's
holding. Once the defendant states a prima facie case of purposeful
306 Id. The first two elements of the Batson test require that defendant's counsel must not
only know that the accused is a member of a cognizable racial group, but also ascertain
racial identifications of venire members. United States Army Legal Services Agency, DAD
Notes, ARMY LAW., Nov. 1989, at 20.
307 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. Although the defendant is "entitled to rely on the fact.., that per-
emptory challenges constitute ajury selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate
who are of a mind to discriminate,'" id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562
(1953)), the Court "did not clarify what other circumstances are relevant." Eric N. Ein-
horn, Note, Batson v. Kentucky andJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Is the Peremptory Chal-
lenge Still Preeminent?, 36 B.C. L. REV. 161, 174 n.137 (1994). At least five relevant factors
have been since identified: "(1) the number of racial group members in the venire
panel; (2) the nature of the crime; (3) the race of the defendant and victim; (4) a pattern
of strikes against racial group members; and (5) the prosecution's questions and state-
ments during voir dire." Brian W. Bolster, Trial: Right to Jury Trial, 86 GEO. L.J. 1618,
1635 n.1747 (1998) (citations omitted).
308 Jeffrey S. Jubera, Comment, The Peremptory Challenge at the Federal Level and in Maryland: Its
Uncertain Future After Georgia v. McCollum, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 225, 232 (1993) (discuss-
ing unresolved questions under Batson). The Court did, however, cite to Castaneda v. Par-
tida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977), wherein it defined the attributes of a cognizable group.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
309 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (expressing confidence in the ability of the trial courts to consider
all relevant circumstances). But see McClain, supra note 229, at 298 (noting that the
Court's confidence that a trial judge's "expertise in supervising voir dire will enable the
judge to determine if the 'relevant circumstances' contribute to the creation of a prima
facie case of discrimination seems unfounded" (footnote omitted)); Paul H. Schwartz,
Comment, Equal Protection in Jury Selection? The Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky in
North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1533, 1569 (1991) (stating that "the ultimate responsibility
within each state for vindicating rights under the equal protection clause lies" not with
trial court judges but rather with the state supreme court).
310 Jeffrey R. Babbin et al., Developments in the Second Circuit: 2003-2004, 37 CONN. L. REV.
963, 1066 n.788 (2005); see also ChristopherJ. Schmidt, Analyzing the Text of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause: Why the Definition of "Equal" Requires a Disproportionate Impact Analysis When
Laws Unequally Affect Racial Minorities, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 85, 89 n.6 (2002)
(noting Batson's implementation of a burden-shifting framework).
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discrimination, the second step shifts the burden to the state,3 ' which
is required to "come forward with a neutral explanation for challeng-
ing black jurors., 312 Although the explanation "need not rise to the
level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause, '13 a prosecutor is
precluded from "stating merely" an assumption that a shared racial
background among the defendant and the juror might affect the par-
tiality of the latter.1 4  Additionally, the prosecutor must furnish a
"'clear and reasonably specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons'
for exercising the challenges. '' 1  Thus, a court's determination of the
reasonableness of a proffered explanation must be made "in light of
the facts of the case. 3 6 Finally, the third step requires that the trial
court determine whether, in light of the state's "neutral explanation,"
the defendant established purposeful discrimination. 7
C. The Legacy of Batson and its Progeny
Although it "has never explained the justification for the prima
facie requirement in the peremptory challenge context,3 18 the Su-
preme Court has since elaborated upon and refined Batson, which
gave minority defendants "an easier job in raising discrimination
claims., 3 9 For example, the Court engaged in a "significant expan-
311 Once the burden shifts to the state, "trial courts face the difficult burden of assessing
prosecutors' motives." Batson, 476 U.S. at 105-06 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing King
v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493, 501-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)).
312 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. "Neutral" is akin to "nonracial." Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a
Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal
Trial, 102 HARV. L. REV. 808, 809 (1989); see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352,
360 (1991) (plurality opinion) ("A neutral explanation ... means an explanation based
on something other than the race of the juror.").
313 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
314 Id. A proponent was also precluded from merely denying a discriminatory motive or af-
firming good faith in making an individual decision. Id.; see also Antony Page, Batson 's
Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 167
(2005) (noting how assertions of good faith are insufficient under Batson).
315 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20 (quoting Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
258 (1983)).
316 Quin M. Sorenson, Backdooring Batson: The Improper Use of Racial Memory and Other "Pecu-
liar" Characteristics in Juror Challenges, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 71, 83 (2003).
317 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. As one scholar observed, "Batson's success at this stage, therefore,
depends largely on courts adequately scrutinizing prosecutors' proffered reasons to de-
termine whether those reasons are genuine or merely pretexts for discrimination."
Schwartz, supra note 309, at 1560; see also supra note 311.
318 DiPrima, supra note 184, at 904.
319 Glen Elsasser, Court's Latest Cures forJury Bias, CHI. TRIB., May 11, 1986, at IC.
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sion of Batson"2" when it held in Powers v. Ohios21 that a defendant
could assert a Batson challenge against an excluded juror who was
neither a member of, nor shared the same cognizable group, as the
defendant.3 22 One year later, the Court extended Batson to civil pro-
ceedings in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. 3 holding that civil liti-
gants may not exercise peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on
the basis of race.3 4 Further expanding the Batson doctrine by consid-
ering its inverse application, the Court's decision in Georgia v.
McCollum 32 5 "prohibit[ed] a criminal defendant from engaging in
purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of
peremptory challenges"326 and permitted the state to assert the rights
of excluded jurors.2 7  Not limited solely on account of race, the
Court subsequently proscribed "discriminatory use of peremptory
strikes based on gender 3 8 in JE.B. v. Alabama.329 Two recent cases,33 331
Johnson v. California330 and Miller-El v. Dretke, further refined Batson
by "acknowledge [ing] the onerous standard that a party faces when
320 John P. Marks, Case Note, Bader v. State: The Arkansas Supreme Court Restricts the Role Relig-
ion May Play injury Selection, 55 ARK. L. REv. 613, 628 (2002).
321 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
322 Id. at 415. The Court determined that a white defendant had standing to raise an equal
protection right of an excluded blackjuror. Id. at 410-16. Recognizing that "[b]oth the
excluded juror and the criminal defendant have a common interest in eliminating racial
discrimination from the courtroom," id. at 413, the Court noted that "Batson was designed
to serve multiple ends, only one of which was to protect individual defendants from dis-
crimination in the selection ofjurors." Id. at 406 (citing Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 259
(1986) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
323 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
324 Noting that "discrimination on the basis of race in selecting a jury in a civil proceeding
harms the excluded juror no less than discrimination in a criminal trial," id. at 619, the
Court held that the state action doctrine applied to civil cases because the "selection of
jurors represents a unique governmental function delegated to private litigants by the
government and attributable to the government for purposes of invoking constitutional
protections against discrimination by reason of race." Id. at 627.
325 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
326 Id. at 59. The Court built upon Edmonson's framework, finding that the "jury system as a
whole, 'simply could not exist' without the 'overt, significant participation of the govern-
ment,'" id. at 51 (quoting Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622), to conclude that "a defendant's dis-
criminatory exercise of a peremptory challenge is a violation of equal protection.. .. " Id.
at 55.
327 Id. at 55-57; see Brand, supra note 129, at 582 (stating that McCollum permitted prosecu-
tors to raise Batson objections "to race-based peremptory challenges by white criminal de-
fendants against black jurors').
328 Christopher M. Ferdico, Note, The Death of the Peremptory Challenge: J.E.B. v. Alabama, 28
CREIGHTON L. REv. 1177, 1778 (1995).
329 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
330 545 U.S. 162 (2005).
331 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
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objecting to a peremptory challenge and decreas[ing] the burden for
the objecting party.
3 3 2
1. Johnson: Clarifying the Scope of a Prima Facie Case of
Discrimination
In Johnson, the Court addressed whether, under Batson's first step
of its three-step burden-shifting framework,13 ' an objecting party
"must show that it is more likely than not the other party's peremp-
tory challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermissible group
bias., 334 After the prosecutor utilized three peremptory challenges to
strike African-American jurors, the trial court "did not ask the prose-
cutor to explain the rationale for his strikes" and overruled the objec-
tion.335 Batson, according to the California Supreme Court, estab-
lished a "'mandatory"' rebuttable presumption that "does not merely
constitute 'enough evidence to permit the inference' that discrimination
has occurred."
33 6
The Johnson Court, however, reversed,337 finding no justification
for a showing "so onerous that a defendant would have to persuade
the judge.., that the challenge was more likely than not the product
of purposeful discrimination., 33 8 Rather, a defendant satisfies the first
step "by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to
draw an inference that discrimination has occurred., 3 9 Where the
state responds with "a frivolous or utterly nonsensical justification for
332 Tiffany Mitchell, Should Courts Eliminate Peremptory Challenges?, 3 MINOR1Y TRIAL LAW. 1, 1
(Fall 2005).
333 See supra notes 310-17 and accompanying text.
334 Johnson, 545 U.S. at 168 (quoting People v. Johnson, 71 P.3d 270, 280 (Cal. 2003)).
335 Id. at 165. The trial court "simply found that petitioner had failed to establish a prima
facie case.. ." Id.
336 Id. at 167 (quoting Johnson, 71 P.3d at 278). The California Supreme Court based its in-
terpretation of Batson upon the fact that the United States Supreme Court "reserved for
state courts 'some flexibility in establishing the exact procedures to follow' in implement-
ing Batson." E1-Mallawany, supra note 151, at 3345 (quoting Johnson, 71 P.3d at 277). Jus-
tice Stevens, writing for the majority of the Court, found that California's "'more likely
than not' standard is an inappropriate yardstick by which to measure the sufficiency of a
prima facie case." Johnson, 545 U.S. at 168.
337 Johnson, 545 U.S. at 173.
338 Id. at 170.
339 Id. Such evidence "need only be sufficient to support a logical conclusion or suspicion
that the prosecutor's exclusion of the juror might be the consequence of the juror's be-
longing to a cognizable racial group." El-Mallawany, supra note 151, at 3345 (footnote
omitted).
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its strike, the case does not end-it merely proceeds to step three, 3 o
which requires the court to determine "whether the opponent of the
strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
3 4
1
The Court's holding ensured that the "Batson framework is designed
to produce actual answers to suspicions and inferences that discrimi-
nation may have infected the jury selection process 341 through an
"appropriate standard" 343 that requires only that the defendant estab-
lish an inference of discrimination.
2. Miller-El: Reigning in Neutral Explanations and Emphasizing Court
Assessment of Plausibility
In Miller-El, the Court "revisted Batson's steps two and three and
conducted an extremely detailed and fact-intensive analysis of the
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges and other tactics during
voir dire. 344  It addressed "the chink in Batson's armor"3 5 : a "weak
ness" surrounding "the particular reasons a prosecutor might give,
3 46
for using peremptory strikes against jurors. Justice Souter acknowl-
edged that " [i]f any facially neutral reason sufficed to answer a Batson
challenge, then Batson would not amount to much more than
Swain., 34 7  Consequently, defendants could avail themselves of "all
,,348relevant circumstances in order to counterbalance the "large
loophole" created by Batson.49
340 Johnson, 545 U.S. at 171. Any reason, "so long as it is not based on race, is sufficient to
shift the burden back to the defendant to prove that those reasons are pretextual or
false." EI-Mallawany, supra note 151, at 3347. Even statistical numbers "alone, without
any other facts or circumstances," raise an inference of discrimination under the first
step. Amanda S. Hitchcock, "Deference Does Not by Definition Preclude Relief": The Impact of
Miller-El v. Dretke on Batson Review in North Carolina Capital Appeals, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1328,
1346 (2006); see also infra Part III.C.2.
341 Johnson, 545 U.S. at 171 (per curiam) (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768
(1995)).
342 Id. at 172.
343 Heather Davenport, Comment, Blinking Reality: Race and Criminal Jury Selection in Light of
Ovalle, Miller-El, andJohnson, 58 BAYLOR L. REv. 949, 981 (2006).
344 Id. at 972; cf Lt. Col. Patricia A. Ham, Crossing the Is and Dotting the T's: The Year in Court-
Martial Personnel, Voir Dire and Challenges, and Pleas and Pretrial Agreements, ARMY LAW.,
July 2004, at 10, 28 (suggesting that only the third Batson step was implicated).
345 Hitchcock, supra note 340, at 1334.
346 Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005).
347 Id.
348 Id. (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (1986)).
349 Jackson, supra note 236, at 107.
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The contempt the Court had for prosecutorial techniques during
voir dire was inherent in the opinion's tone,' ° with the majority char-
acterizing prosecutorial justifications for striking jurors to which the
lower court held itself prostrate as "reek[ing] of afterthought.'
'
3
1
Addressing Batson's second step, the Court articulated a "critical
point,' 35' namely that reasons proffered by the prosecution must have
some veracity:
[W]hen illegitimate grounds like race are in issue, a prosecutor simply
has got to state his reasons as best he can and stand or fall on the plausi-
bility of the reasons he gives. A Batson challenge does not call for a mere
exercise in thinking up any rational basis. If the stated reason does not
hold up, its pretextual significance does not fade because a trialjudge, or
an appeals court, can imagine a reason that might not have been shown
up as false.353
Thus, the burden of providing a racially neutral explanation rested
with the prosecution at the time action was taken,3' 4 and the trial
court bore the responsibility "to assess the plausibility of that reason
in light of all evidence with a bearing on it."' 355 The Court's reliance• • 356
upon statistical data was significant, suggesting that "detailed data
of the prosecution's behavior during voir dire.., appears to provide
defense counsel with the greatest hope of presenting a successful Bat-
son challenge." 357  With regard to Batson's third step, Miller-El "sig-
naled concerns by the Court that the lower federal courts were not
sufficiently monitoring the quality of justice coming from the state
courts ."
350 See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 253 ("The case for discrimination ... include [s] broader patterns
of practice during the jury selection. The prosecution's shuffling of the venire panel, its
enquiry into views on the death penalty, its questioning about minimum acceptable sen-
tences: all indicate decisions probably based on race.").
351 Id. at 246. The lower court's "readiness to accept the State's substitute reason ignores not
only its pretextual timing but the other reasons rendering it implausible." Id.
352 Hitchcock, supra note 340, at 1340.
353 Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 252.
354 But see id. at 278-307 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that no evidence presented in the
state court proceeding suggested discrimination against African-American veniremen).
355 Id. at 252 (majority opinion).
356 The Court noted that the "numbers describing the prosecution's use of peremptories are
remarkable." Id. at 240; see also Hitchcock, supra note 340, at 1337 (noting the Court's
reference to statistical evidence).
357 Maxwell C. Smith, Note, Bell v. Ozmint, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 121, 130 (2003). But see Daven-
port, supra note 343, at 982 (arguing that "statistics alone will likely continue not to be
dispositive on the issue of discrimination").
358 Christopher E. Smith & Madhavi McCall, Criminal Justice and the 2002-2003 United States
Supreme Court Term, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 859, 880 (2004).
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3. Beyond Batson: The Affirmative Action Frontier
Some scholars question whether Miller-El represents "a testament
to the failure of Batson to eradicate discrimination in voir dire."' 59
Inherent within these cases is a selection process wherein race in-
formed the use of peremptory challenges. 36  Following the Court'sa z" 362
decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, which involved a separate but equally
"selective selection '' 36 process, the intersection between "compelling
state interests in the jury room [and] in the class room"3  has be-
come more acute: Grutter "creates an opening to reinforce the right
to a fair trial and obtain equal protection for minority defendants
during jury selection. 365 Whether Grutter, in fact, "provide [s] support
for opening the process of jury selection. . . to more fully include
people of color, 366 depends upon whether its pronouncements on af-
firmative action within the university admissions context relate to Bat-
son and the peremptory challenge cases.
IV. VIEWS FROM THE GRU7YER A DISCOURSE ON APPOSITENESS
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Grutter in order to "re-
solve the disagreement among the federal appellate courts regarding
whether diversity is a compelling government interest that justifies
narrowly tailored uses of race for admissions purposes in public uni-
versities., 367 A majority "concluded that the 'narrowly tailored use of
race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in ob-
taining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student
359 Sandra Guerra Thompson, The Non-Discrimination Ideal of Hernandez v. Texas Confronts a
"Culture" of Discrimination: The Amazing Story of Miller-El v. Texas, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L.
REv. 97, 101 (2005).
360 See supra notes 92 & 93 and accompanying text.
361 See supra text accompanying notes 328 & 329.
362 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
363 Karen Brandon, Computer Age Leaving Many Blacks, Hispanics out of Touch, CHI. TRIB., July
9, 1999, at 6.
364 John J. Francis, Peremptory Challenges, Grutter, and Critical Mass: A Means of Reclaiming the
Promise of Batson, 29 VT. L. REV. 297, 298 (2005); see alsoJoseph Litman, The Senator Who
Cried Wolf MicH. DAiLY, Feb. 11, 2003 (noting that "[f]rom college admissions to jury se-
lection, race seems to always emerge as a crucial facet").
365 Francis, supra note 364, at 298.
366 Phoebe A. Haddon, Does Grutter Offer Courts an Opportunity to Consider Race injury Selection
and Decisions Related to Promoting Fairness in the Deliberation Process?, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTs. L. REv. 547, 547 (2004).
367 Robert A. Caplen, Case Comment, Constitutional Law: Forecasting the Sunset of Racial Prefer-
ences in Higher Education While Broadening Their Horizons, 56 FLA. L. REv. 853, 854 n.10
(2004).
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body' was not proscribed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment., 36 This Part considers whether Grutter's holding
is applicable to circumstances beyond the educational context in
which it was decided and argues that narrowly interpreting Grutter is
contrary to the majority opinion and the way in which courts have
applied its reasoning.
A. A Narrow Interpretation: Limiting Grutter's Context to Academic
Freedom and Education
It is conceivable to place Grutter within the context in which the
Court framed its inquiry: "to decide whether the use of race as a fac-
tor in student admissions... is unlawful.0 69 With firm reliance upon
and adoption of Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, the Grutter Court concluded that "student body
diversity 'is a compelling state interest.' ' 371 In doing so, the Court
"gave a far more detailed explanation of the purpose and scope of
educational institutional autonomy than the discussion offered by
Justice Powell in Bakke. 3 72  One of Gruttds lasting legacies is its
61 ,373strong recognition of institutional academic freedom ....
1. Inseparability of Academic Freedom from Education
Inherently context specific, academic freedom is designed "to
protect scholarship and teaching in higher education from untoward
political interference, primarily by granting universities autonomy
over certain core scholarly and educational policies.374 Tracing the
Supreme Court's development of academic freedom principles dem-
onstrates its application within and limitation to classroom activity
368 Robert A. Caplen, The "Fifth" Freedom: Freedom from Impermissible Expansion of "Academic
Freedom" to University Admissions, 36 Sw. U. L. REV. 1, 22 (2007).
369 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311 (2003) (emphasis added).
370 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion).
371 Caplen, supra note 368, at 526 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325). "Bakke was the first-
and before Grutter, the only-case in which the Supreme Court examined the constitu-
tionality of affirmative action in the context of university admissions." Joshua M. Levine,
Comment, Stigma's Opening: Grutter's Diversity Interest(s) and the New Calculus for Affirmative
Action in Higher Education, 94 CAL. L. REV. 457, 457 (2006).
372 Paul Horwitz, Grutter s First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461,495 (2005).
373 Laura A. Jeltema, Comment, Legislators in the Classroom: Why State Legislatures Cannot Decide
Higher Education Curricula, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 215, 238-39 (2004).
374 J. Peter Byrne, Constitutional Academic Freedom After Grutter: Getting Real About the "Four
Freedoms" of a University, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 929, 930 (2006) (citation omitted).
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and intellectual inquiry."' The Grutter Court, however, "utilized aca-
demic freedom principles to encompass university admissions poli-
cies, 37 6 by determining that "academic judgments about admis-
sions... have a sufficient First Amendment dimension that they
ought to have special force in the compelling interest calculus., 377 It
emphasized that courts should defer to "educational judgment
that... diversity is essential to [an institution's] educational mis-
sion... ,,3" Thus, an argument that Grutter is a limited reflection of
"the Court's jurisprudence on race and education"3 79 is not without
merit.
38 0
2. Application Dependent upon an Institution's Educational Mandate
At least one court construed Grutter "quite narrowly, 3 8' lending
support for a reading of the affirmative action case 82 "as limited to an
educational context. 3 83 In Lomack v. City of Newark, 84 the Third Cir-
cuit addressed Grutter within the context of a race-based diversity
mandate issued by the Newark Fire Department.3 8 5  The local gov-
ernment argued that it had a compelling interest in integrating its
fire departments "because 'integration in the workplace is no less im-
portant than in an educational setting.'3 8 6 The district court, relying
375 See generally Caplen, supra note 368.
376 Id. at 527.
377 Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to Academic Freedom?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 907, 921
(2006).
378 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (emphases added).
379 Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1517 (2005).
380 See Horwitz, supra note 372, at 568 n.493 ("I doubt Grutter carries much significance for
the future of affirmative action programs outside the university.").
381 Lomack v. City of Newark, 463 F.3d 303, 309 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Comfort v. Lynn Sch.
Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2005) ("But Grutter teaches that the compelling state in-
terest in diversity should be judged in relation to the educational benefits that it seeks to
produce." (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330) (emphasis added)).
382 "Of course, Grutter is an affirmative action case." Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Note, Grutter at
Work: A Title VII Critique of Constitutional Affirmative Action, 115 YALE L.J. 1408, 1430
(2006).
383 Nancy C. Marcus, Beyond Romer and Lawrence: The Right to Privacy Comes Out of the Closet,
15 COLUM.J. GENDER & L. 355, 402 (2006); see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 382, at 1437
("A strong case can be made for limiting the decision to university admissions: Grutter
emphasizes the distinctive context of higher education and the particular deference the
Court gives to academic decisions...
384 463 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2006).
385 Id. at 305-07.
386 Id. at 309 (quoting Brief of Appellees at 30, Lomack v. City of Newark, 463 F.3d 303 (3d
Cir. 2006)).
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on Grutter, agreed, noting that credible evidence suggested that a fire-
fighter's training "is enhanced by a diverse, multi-generational envi-
ronment" and that "[r] acial stereotypes can be broken down in this
setting as well as in a classroom.3 8 7 The Third Circuit, however, re-
versed,388 adopting the plaintiffs' argument that "a fire department is
not a law school and that the benefits of diversity to such an educa-
tional environment do not apply to a firehouse whose mission is to
fight fires and deal with other community emergencies, not to edu-
cate tomorrow's leaders."
38 9
The Lomack court distinguished Grutter, which "established that
educational benefits are compelling in a law school context," by declar-
ing it inapplicable "in the firefighting context. 3 9' Grutter, the Third
Circuit maintained, "does not stand for the proposition that the edu-
cational benefits of diversity are always a compelling interest, regard-
less of the context. Rather, it stands for the narrow premise that the
educational benefits of diversity can be a compelling interest to an in-
stitution whose mission is to educate.,39' Thus, the court focused upon
the "respective missions" of the institutions in question to conclude
that "Grutter's holding regarding a compelling interest in the educa-
tional benefits of diversity is unavailing"3 92 : a school educates stu-
dents and prepares them for "work and citizenship, 93 while a fire
department "control[s], fight[s,] and extinguish[es] ... any confla-
gration which occurs within the city limits." 3 94 The disparity between
the two missions was strong enough for the Lomack court to reject the
government's diversity benefits argument as a compelling interest.
3 95
387 Lomackv. City of Newark, No. 04-6085(JWB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18892, at *19 (D.N.J.
Aug. 25, 2005) (emphasis added). It concluded:
When one "strictly scrutinizes" the Newark transfer policy and finds it to be de-
signed to eliminate de facto segregation in its firehouses .... with attendant edu-
cational, sociological and job-performance enhancements as well, one is led to the
inevitable conclusion that this policy was implemented to achieve a 'compelling
interest' of the City.
Id. at *21.
388 Lomack, 463 F.3d at 305.
389 Lomack, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11892, at *18.
390 Lomack, 463 F.3d at 309 (emphasis in original).
391 Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
392 Id.
393 Id. at 309 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003)).
394 Id. at 310 (quoting NEWARK, N.J. GEN. ORD. vol. I, tit. II, ch. 21, § 1.2 (2005)).
395 Id.; see supra note 380.
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B. A Broad Interpretation: Extending Grutter 's Context to Non-Education
Based Programs
While Grutter "may be difficult to extend beyond academic deci-
sion making and outside of the higher education context because of
the key element of academic freedom under the First Amend-
ment, a plausible reading and interpretation of Grutter suggests
otherwise. 97 The majority's holding, "perversely designed to pro-
long ... controversy and... litigation, 98 has "serious collateral con-
sequences 99 that "encourage a proliferation of diversity-based appli-
cations, 40 0 both within and without the context of the American
educational system. With regard to the former, Justice Scalia "fore-
shadowed that future lawsuits will question whether a university has
exceeded the bounds of good faith, 4 1 among other things, and that
he "do[es] not look forward" to those cases brewing on the hori-
zon. 4 0  Rather than foreclose the latter, Grutter embraces the possibil-
ity of wide application through the "valence and atmospherics" 3 of
the Court's broad-stroked invocations of patriotism and national se-
curity. 104
1. Reexamining 'Marketplace'Interests in Diversity
The justifications employed by Grutters majority militate against a
limited application of the case solely within the educational sphere.
Grutter generated an "unprecedented number"40 5-"at least eighty-
396 Angelo N. Ancheta, Contextual Strict Scrutiny and Race-Conscious Policy Making, 36 LOy. U.
CHI. L.J. 21, 47 (2004); see supra Part IV.A.1.
397 See Haddon, supra note 366, at 552 (noting the existence of a "promising basis from which
to extend Grutter's influence beyond the education setting"). But see Rebecca Hanner
White, Affirmative Action in the Workplace: The Significance of Grutter ?, 92 KY. L.J. 263, 263-
64 (2003-2004) (arguing that the Grutter Court "was careful to limit its discussion to the
question before it .... Whether it would consider racial diversity... in other con-
texts... was left for another day").
398 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
399 Id. at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
400 Caplen, supra note 367, at 864.
401 Id. at 864 n.88.
402 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
403 Cynthia L. Eslund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration and Affirmative Action in
the Workplace, 26 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 20 (2005).
404 Caplen, supra note 368, at 29 (stating that "the Grutter Court seemed swept by the nation-
alistic fervor inherent in [the amici curiae] claim [s]"); see infra Part IV.B.2.
405 Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic
Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 117 (2003).
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four"4 6-of amicus briefs "ever submitted in a single case before the
Court,"407 which is evidence of its strong and questionable reliance
upon expert studies and reports. 4°s Two "compelling briefs,"49 cited
for the proposition that the benefits of student body diversity are "not
theoretical but real," 410 "came from the military and from a number
of large American corporations, all of whom were talking about their
own need for diversity." 4" Thus, "[w]hile these briefs support af-
firmative action in education,... their language suggests they are lay-
ing the groundwork to justify workplace affirmative action."4 2
The Grutter majority, "[i]n resounding terms,... answered that
diversity is a social good because it is consistent with the interests ar-
ticulated by the utilitarian strand of the business, military, and profes-
sional elite amici, along with the universities."4 3 In fact, the Court's
recitation of the "'substantial benefits' associated with diversity [was]
a conclusion based entirely on what others told the Supreme
Court. 4 1 4 It invoked themes resonating with the views of the Fortune1. 411
500 companies upon which it relied, particularly the need to de-
406 DennisJ. Shields, A Response to Professor Crump's Narrow Tailoring Analysis ofGrutter: Does It
Matter How Many Angels Can Dance on the Head of a Pin?, 56 FLA. L. REV. 761, 770 n.38
(2004). Sixty-nine of the briefs were filed in support of the University of Michigan Law
School. Id.
407 Beverly 1. Moran, Constructing Reality: Social Science and Race Cases, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
243, 243 (2005).
408 Justice Thomas criticized the majority for its "heavy reliance upon social science evi-
dence." Caplen, supra note 368, at 28 n.219; see also Moran, supra note 407, at 243 ("View-
ing Grutter v. Bollinger against other canonical American race cases, it does not necessarily
follow that social science is the best way to address the questions Grutter raised; and yet,
social science was clearly the method of choice.")
409 Stephen Henderson, Supreme Court's Affirmative Action Ruling Extending Beyond Schools,
KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIBUNE NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 26, 2003; see also Estlund, supra note 403, at
20 n.97 ("The majority was especially impressed, it appears, with the brief of the retired
generals....").
410 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). These "benefits" included, according to
the University of Michigan Law School's amici, "promot[ing] learning outcomes and
'better prepar[ing] students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better
prepar[ing] them as professionals.'" Id. (quoting Brief for the Amer. Educ. Research
Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 3, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-
241), 2003 WL 398292).
411 Henderson, supra note 409.
412 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 382, at 1438 (emphasis added).
413 Brown-Nagin, supra note 379, at 1481.
414 Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: Grutter, School Desegregation, and Federalism, 45 W,;M. &
MARY L. REV. 1691, 1701 (2004).
415 "The Grutter Court gave serious weight to business... leaders' amicus briefs... ." Joshua
Wilkenfeld, Note, Newly Compelling: Reexamining Judicial Construction of Juries in the After-
math ofGrutter v. Bollinger, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2291, 2320 (2004).
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velop skills for today's "increasingly global marketplace .... 416 Not-
withstanding that the global marketplace to which Grutter alluded is
distinguishable from the original conception of a "marketplace of
ideas" articulated in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 41  the majority dis-
missed the clear difference between these marketplaces without con-
sideration.4 8
Instead, Grutter clumsily fused an amalgamation of the two mar-
ketplace metaphors,4 9 failing to reconcile the former, an economi-
cally driven "marketplace" built upon "succe [ss] in America,, 420 with
the latter, an academic "marketplace" imbued with "wide exposure to
that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth .... .421 More-
over, the Court's emphasis upon universities and law schools as a
"training ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders, 422 belies
another, if not more important, staple of the American experience
and "major form of human capital investment" 42 : on-the-job train-
416 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (citations omitted); see supra notes 420 &
424.
417 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (citation omitted).
418 See infra notes 420-421 & 424.
419 Grutter's "marketplace rationales... suggest[] that a diverse legal profession is essential
not only for economic or market reasons but, more importantly, also for broader democ-
ratic reasons." Carla D. Pratt, Taking Diversity Seriously: Affirmative Action and the Democratic
Role of Law Schools: A Response to Professor Brown, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 55, 61 (2006).
420 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333. The amicus brief submitted on behalf of 3M and cited by the
majority noted:
[T]he changing face of America is reflected in the marketplace, as both the work-
place and the purchasers of products and services become increasingly diverse.
The individuals who run and staff the amid [sic] businesses must be able to under-
stand, learn from, collaborate with, and design products and services for clientele
and associates from diverse racial, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds. American
multinational businesses, including amid [sic], are especially attuned to this con-
cern because they serve not only the increasingly diverse population of the United
States, but racially and ethnically diverse populations around the world.
Brief for 3M et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at *9-10, Grutter v. Bollinger,
288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-1447), 2001 WL 34624918. The companies cite no
authority-legal, scientific, or otherwise-in support of these propositions. See id.
421 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); see also Healy v. James, 408 U.S.
169, 180-81 (1972) ("The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the
marketplace of ideas, and we break no new constitutional ground in reaffirming this Na-
tion's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom." (emphasis added) (citation omit-
ted)).
422 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332; cf Alison Bath, Execs, Officials Focus on Future Economy at Summit,
RENO GAZETTE-J. (Nev.), Apr. 12, 2005, at lH ("[E]very worker might not need-or
want-a college education.").
423 Daniel J. Libenson, Leasing Human Capital: Toward a New Foundation for Employment Termi-
nation Law, 27 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 111, 140 (2006).
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ing.2 Given that "[d]iversity training is now commonplace in corpo-
rate America, ,425 it is difficult to link the value of classroom diversity
with workplace diversity, the latter of which is achieved independ-
424 Dean Ellwood emphasized the importance of "industry-based training or sector-based
training," which differs from the educational training offered in universities or law
schools. Confronting Poverty: What Role for Public Programs?, 10 EMPL. RTs. & EMPLOY. POL'Y
J. 9, 36 (2006). Senator John Edwards echoed a similar sentiment, recognizing that job
training itself is a form of education. Senator John Edwards, Restoring the American
Dream: Fighting Poverty and Strengthening the Middle Class, Keynote Address at the
Journal of Gender, Race &Justice Eleventh Annual Symposium (Oct. 14, 2007), in 10J.
GENDER RACE &JUST. 383, 387 (2007). Additionally, "there is a strong difference between
having a college degree and being highly skilled." Andrew Soukup, Education Lapses Leave
State Vulnerable; Fewer Degrees in Indiana than in Most of the Nation, SOUTH BEND TRIB.
(Ind.), May 15, 2005, at BI; see also Michael W. Freeman, Atlanta Executive Encourages
Haines City Students at Chamber Event to Learn Trades, LEDGER (Fla.), Apr. 22, 2004, at R14
(noting numerous "skilled professions in many other industries where a college degree is
not needed and a skilled trade education is much more appealing to the employer").
Universities do not provide adequate training for students post-graduation. See, e.g.,
Carolyn Carlson, Education's the Issue in District 15, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 19, 2006, at 1
("Employers... are saying our students are coming to them without basic skills. .. ");
Leigh Rivenbark, How to Be the Employee Your Company Can't Live Without, HR MAGAZINE,
Aug. 1, 2006, at 131 ("A college degree does not always translate into useable job
skills.... .") (book review); Hallie Grossman, Standardized Tests May Decide Funding, DAILY
COLLEGIAN (Pa.), available at http://www.collegian.psu.edu/archive/2006/01/01-27-
06tdc/01-27-06dnews-05.asp ("Employers are saying they need certain skills,
and ... people graduating don't have them-they are saying this is not what we want
from a college education."); Stephen Haycox, There's No 'A' For Effort in the Real World,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 16, 2005, at B6 ("Students today are not getting the edu-
cation that used to be implied in a college degree, as many employers testify.").
Virtually all justification§ enumerated by the corporate amici in Grutter reflect less
upon the importance of training received in the formal, university context and more
upon on-site, job-specific training within a respective industry:
[T] hey can make valuable contributions to the workforce. First, a diverse group of
individuals educated in a cross-cultural environment has the ability to facilitate
unique and creative approaches to problem-solving arising from the integration of
different perspectives. Second, such individuals are better able to develop prod-
ucts and services that appeal to a variety of consumers and to market offerings in
ways that appeal to these consumers. Third, a racially diverse group of managers
with cross-cultural experience is better able to work with business partners, em-
ployees, and clientele in the United States and around the world.
Brief for 3M et al., supra note 428, at *10-*11. But see Employers Need Skilled Workers,
ADVOCATE (La.), Dec. 19, 2004, at 10B (stating that employers "are having the most trou-
ble finding workers with basic skills, problem-solving skills and work ethic"). The nexus
between college education and on-the-job contribution is tenuous at best, given that "[a]
large majority-70% of our current workforce-is not college educated, and these work-
ers continue to make vital contributions." The 21st Century Workplace: Preparing for Tomorrow's
Employment Trends Today: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor
and Pensions, 109th Cong. 38 (2005) (testimony ofJared Bernstein) (emphasis added).
425 Michael Z. Green, Addressing Race Discrimination Under Title VII After Forty Years: The Prom-
ise of ADR As Interest-Convergence, 48 How. L.J. 937, 959 (2005) (quoting Michael Selmi,
The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of the Class Action Employment Discrimination Litigation
and Its Effects, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1249, 1306 (2003)).
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ently.4 26 Consequently, the majority's 'justificatory rhetoric,' ' 4 7 which
focused entirely upon "stimulating the global economy, populating
the domestic and global workforce with socially intelligent workers,
and providing legitimacy for the legal profession and the political
economy as a whole, 4 8 falls without the scope of the academy. As
such, extending Grutter beyond its educational context is entirely ap-
• 429
propriate.
2. Deconstructing "Work and Citizenship" Arguments
In addition to adopting wholesale the posture of American busi-
430nesses, the Grutter Court invoked a "work and citizenship" meta-
phor to justify diversity as a compelling interest. 43 ' Bolstered by
amicus curiae from members of the military,4 2 the Court's pro
nouncements provide ample support for extra-educational applica-
tion, particularly since it grounded national security concerns follow-
ing the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks3 s within a diversity
necessity.4 3 4 The amici to which the Court attributed "great weight,
4 3
5
noted:
426 See Leslie Yalof Garfield, Back to Bakke: Defining the Strict Scrutiny Test for Affirmative Action
Policies Aimed at Achieving Diversity in the Classroom, 83 NEB. L. REv. 631, 683 (2005) ("The
'relevant differences' between achieving diversity in the workplace and achieving diversity
in the classroom demand different strict scrutiny tests.") (footnote omitted). For a con-
trasting view arguing that the Court draws a distinction between diversity as integration
and diversity as difference, see generally Bulman-Pozen, supra note 382.
427 Brown-Nagin, supra 379, at 1455.
428 Id. at 1481 (citations omitted).
429 See infra notes 440 & 500. But see infra note 460.
430 See supra Part IV.B.1.
431 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) ("'We have repeatedly acknowledged the
overriding importance of preparing students for work and citizenship, describing educa-
tion as pivotal to 'sustaining our political and cultural heritage' with a fundamental role
in maintaining the fabric of society." (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982))).
432 See Estlund, supra note 403, at 20 n.97 ("The majority was especially impressed, it appears,
with the brief of the retired generals .... ."); see also Caplen, supra note 368, at 29 ("[the
Court] seemed swept by the nationalistic fervor inherent in their claim.").
433 See infa note 442.
434 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 ("To fulfill its mission, the military 'must be selective in admis-
sions for training and education for the officer corps, and it must train and educate a
highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps in a racially diverse educational setting.'"
(quoting Brief forJulius W. Becton, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grut-
ter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241, 02-516), at 29, available at http://ww.vpcomm.umich.edu/
admissions/legal/gruamicus-ussc/um/MilitaryL-both.pdf))); see also text accompanying
infra notes 436 & 440-42.
435 Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of "Affirmative
Action, "94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1070 n.35 (2006).
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The modern American military candidly acknowledges the critical link
between minority officers and military readiness and effectiveness.
"[T]he current leadership views complete racial integration as a military
necessity-that is, as a prerequisite to a cohesive, and therefore effective,
fighting force. In short, success with the challenge of diversity is critical
to national security."
43 6
Yet the military amici grounded their national security argument not
upon Supreme Court precedent, 43 7 but rather upon the Fortune 500• 438
company briefs, emphasizing that, "[1] ike our military security, our
economic security and international competitiveness depend" upon
diversity.439  In this respect, the Court's reliance upon the military
amici's national security justification for diversity is merely a reflected
version of the corporate argument 440 imbued with a greater sense of
"far-fetched 44 1 urgency.
The "work and citizenship" metaphor the Court employed is ex-
pansive, not limiting. While Grutter maintains that " [t] he mission of
a school is to educate students, 'prepar[e] students for work and citi-
zenship,' and cultivate future leaders," 4 4 these goals are not necessar-
436 Brief forJulius W. Becton, et al., supra note 434, at 17-18 (alteration in original).
437 The military amici employed a system justification motive designed to "defend and justify
the social status quo .... " Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Re-
search: Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1119, 1119
(2006). Allusions to national security were potentially persuasive because the military
brief "reduced the pull of ego and group justification motives, given that far fewer indi-
viduals or groups are likely to compete for spots in the military than in the academic ad-
missions contexts. ... " Id. at 1153-54.
438 Caplen, supra note 368, at 29 n.230.
439 Brief forJulius W. Becton, et al., supra note 434, at 29-30.
440 See Green, supra note 425, at 959 ("[Clivil rights progress only occurs in moments when it
benefits... economic profit or national security." (quoting Paul Frymer & John D.
Skretny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action: Law and the New Significance of Race in
America, 36 CONN. L. REv. 677, 678 (2004))).
441 Gregory E. Maggs, The Rehnquist Court's Noninterference with the Guardians of National Secu-
rity, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1122, 1142 (2006) (noting the Court's unjustifiable reliance
upon national security concerns "to justify preferences at an elite law school").
442 Reference to the military amici "fit seamlessly with contemporary sociopolitical dynamics,
since the nation and the world were captivated by the U.S. war against Iraq in the months
before Grutterand Gratz were decided." Brown-Nagin, supra note 379, at 1482.
443 See Haddon, supra note 366, at 555. The concept of citizenship "presupposes the attribu-
tion of freedom," not merely education. Aditi Bagchi, Deliberative Autonomy and Legitimate
State Purpose Under the First Amendment, 68 ALB. L. REv. 815, 833 (2005) (quoting Robert
Post, Managing Deliberation: The Quandary of Democratic Dialogue, 103 ETHICS 654, 672
(1993)). It is difficult to attribute "concrete meaning" to a definition of citizenship.
Manfred Zuleeg, What Holds a Nation Together? Cohesion and Democracy in the United States of
America and in the European Union, 45 AM.J. COMP. L. 505, 509 (1997).
444 Lomack v. City of Newark, 463 F.3d 303, 309-10 (3d Cir. 2006) (second alteration in
original).
Dec. 2007]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ily within the exclusive purview of the educational system." 5 Justice
O'Connor's opinion has been read to embrace "democratic legiti-
macy as a justification for diversity,'446 by lauding "social goods like
professionalism, citizenship, or leadership." 447 Yet the Court suggests
that it is only through access to a legal education that the "utopian
goals, 448 of democracy"49 and citizenship 450 are effectuated.
Given that democracy "has no universal meaning,, 451 the ability for
members of "all racial and ethnic groups" to participate in "the civic
life of our Nation, 452 is not an end justified by any one prescribed or
defined set of means.455 While the Grutter Court suggests the exclusiv-
445 See, e.g., In re Carroll, 896 A.2d 566, 576-77 (Pa. 2006) (noting that participation in "pub-
lic associations and positions in addition to [an individual's] official, paid posi-
tions.., simply reflect[s] active lives of good citizenship"); infra note 453.
446 Guinier, supra note 405, at 118.
447 Horwitz, supra note 372, at 550.
448 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 374 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
449 "Lawyers are the administrators of our democracy." Pratt, supra note 419, at 62; see also
Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Grutter and Gratz: A Critical Analysis, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 459, 506
(2004) (noting the Court's acknowledgement that "lawyers play a pivotal role in protect-
ing legal rights and also tend to hold a disproportionate number of leadership posi-
tions").
450 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332-33. Of note is the fact that Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003),
Grutter's companion case in which the Court invalidated the University of Michigan's un-
dergraduate admissions program, is bereft of any discussion of the importance or virtue of
education in "preparing students for.., citizenship." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332; see also
Danielle C. Gray & Travis LeBlanc, Integrating Elite Law Schools and the Legal Profession: A
View from the Black Law Student Associations of Harvard, Stanford, and Yale Law Schools, 19
HARV. BLACKLETITER L.J. 43, 49 (2003) (stating that "ignor[ing] important differences be-
tween the law school and undergraduate contexts.., lends to conflation of the two in the
Court's deliberations"). But see Richard H. Sander, A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Ac-
tion in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 400-10 (2004) (comparing admissions
data from both the undergraduate and law school and concluding the latter functions as
a quota since the "steepness of the curves for both blacks and whites negates the possibil-
ity that there is some nonacademic, nonracial factor.... The only logical possibilities are
that schools 'race-track' admissions. .. ."); Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter,
21 CONST. COMMENT. 221, 245 (2004) ("[I]t is likely that the Grutter and Gratz affirmative
action programs are very similar in actual operation."). Thus, Grutter's emphasis is not
upon education generally but rather "what happens at the doorstep of legal education."
Nancy E. Dowd, Kenneth B. Nunn, &Jane E. Pendergast, Diversity Matters: Race, Gender,
and Ethnicity in Legal Education, 15 U. FLA.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 35 (2003).
451 Pratt, supra note 419, at 62.
452 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
453 See, e.g., Jimmie M. Garland Sr., Look Back So You Are Ready to Forge Ahead, LEAF-CHRONICLE
(Clarksville, Tenn.), Nov. 5, 2006, at 13A (attaching no educational requirement-legal,
medical, or otherwise-as a prerequisite for Americans' abilities to "demonstrate our
support for democracy in many ways. We can volunteer our service to local programs,
serve as jurors, or simply serve as members of boards and committees appointed to con-
duct the business of our community").
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ity of the law school classroom forum as the conduit 4 4 through which
to fulfill the "dream of one Nation, indivisible, 4" citizenship is an
evolving,4 6 individualized process that encompasses "a characteristic
of personhood' ' 5 7 rather than requiring an institutionalized setting.
4
5
8
just as "fundamental [a] role in maintaining the fabric of society, 459 is
reflected within other fora. 460 Relevant here is the importance of the
jury,46 itself a "basic right[] of citizenship 462 which "invests each citi-
zen with a kind of magistracy; it makes them all feel the duties which
they are bound to discharge towards society; and the part which they
take in the Government., 463 One scholar notes:
Like university classrooms, the jury room should be a place where stereo-
types are minimized and discussion is lively and enlightening for partici-
pants because it makes for the cultivation of better, more responsive citi-
zens. This citizenship-building is enhanced by diverse members of the
community self-consciously engaging in deliberation as part of their par-
464
ticipation in democratic governance.
In essence, the work and citizenship metaphor, when applied to jury
service, furthers the judiciary's "legitimacy in the eyes of the citi-
454 See Brown-Nagin, supra note 379, at 1484 (noting that the Grutter Court "conceded that
professions such as law are conduits to leadership," which fosters "'legitimacy in the eyes
of the citizenry'" (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332)).
455 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
456 Citizenship is a "process of expanded involvement in evolving public institutions." Rich-
ard B. Bilder & Gerald L. Neuman, Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices, 96
AM.J. INT'L L. 514, 515 (2002) (book review).
457 PatrickJ. Dooley, Note, IAm Who IAm, OrAm I? A Comparison ofthe Equal Protection of Sex-
ual Minorities in Canadian and U.S. Courts: Immutability Has Only Found a Home North of the
Border, 17 ARz.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 371, 382 (2000).
458 See Haddon, supra note 366, at 553 ("The fact that the Court reached its decision that di-
versity is a compelling interest by emphasizing its willingness to defer in light of the uni-
versity's 'special niche' ... does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that only universi-
ties will be accorded ... the latitude to be race-conscious.").
459 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331.
460 Courts "may be reluctant" to apply Grutter's reasoning within contexts external to higher
education out of "fear that-once unleashed-forward-looking justifications cannot be
constrained." Helen Norton, Stepping Through Grutter's Open Doors: What the University of
Michigan Affirmative Action Cases Mean for Race-Conscious Government Decisionmaking, 78
TEMP. L. REv. 543, 574 (2005).
461 See supra text accompanying note 75.
462 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 (1986) (stating that wholesale exclusion from jury
service constitutes a "substantial deprivation of the[] basic rights of citizenship").
463 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (quoting 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 334-37 (Schocken 1st ed. 1961)). Jury service "illuminate[s] the
connections between the civil and political rights of citizenship." Gretchen Ritter, Juy
Service and Women's Citizenship Before and After the Nineteenth Amendment, 20 LAw & HIsT.
REv. 479, 483 (2002).
464 Haddon, supra note 366, at 553.
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zenry.' ' 465 Such an interpretation arguably furthers the system's "op-
erational need.,
466
3. Embracing "Operational Needs "Justifications
A third interpretation of Grutter, and one already recognized by
courts, suggests that its application transcends the educational realm
by "conclusively establish[ing] the possibility of non-remedial objec-
tives for race-based programs."467 Courts have accepted "operational
needs" arguments to justify diversity programs implemented post-
Grutter by characterizing the decision as an "'operational needs' opin-
ion. '"' Moreover, Grutter's "operational needs" underpinnings, bol-
stered by.its reference to national security concerns and the military• •469
amici, suggest that the incorporation of a "critical mass" of minori-
ties within a university admissions calculus 47° is appropriate in the law
enforcement context. 4 1  Although the Third Circuit in Lomack did
not consider an operational needs argument when it invalidated the
Newark Fire Department diversity policy, 42 it nonetheless acknowl-
edged its application by coordinate courts.473
465 Id. at 555.
466 See infra Part IV.B.3.
467 Michael K. Fridkin, The Permissibility of Non-Remedial Justifications for Racial Preferences in
Public Contracting, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 509, 515 (2004).
468 Lomack v. City of Newark, 463 F.3d 303, 310 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006). Grutter "found that law
schools have an operational need for a diverse student body in order to effectively achieve
their educational mission." Id.; see also Colloquium, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
757, 776 (noting that Grutter adopted the law school's "operational needs" justification).
But see Bulman-Pozen, supra note 382, at 1411 n.6 ("Grutte?'s diversity rationale for af-
firmative action is significantly broader than the operational need defense.").
469 See supra Part IV.B. 1.
470 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318 (2003). Critical mass, according to the law school,
means 'meaningful numbers' or 'meaningful representation,' which [the Director
of Admissions] understood to mean a number that encourages underrepresented
minority students to participate in the classroom and not feel iso-
lated .... [T]here is no number, percentage, or range of numbers or percentages
that constitute critical mass.
Id. at 318. But see id. at 346-47 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("[T]he University of Michigan Law School's mystical 'critical mass' justification for its
discrimination by race challenges even the most gullible mind. The admissions statistics
show it to be a sham to cover a scheme of racially proportionate admissions.").
471 See Allan N. MacLean, Note, The "Critical Mass" and Law Enforcement, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
297, 302 (2005) ("The military leaders' amici brief.., extols the benefits of a diverse po-
lice force.").
472 The City "does not argue that diversity within individual fire companies is in any other
way necessary, or even beneficial, to the Fire Department's mission of fighting fire, i.e.,
that the Department has an operational need for diverse fire companies... ." Lomack v.
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" 474The Seventh Circuit, beginning with Wittmer v. Peters, has been
at the foreground 475 in broadly applying the "operational needs" ar-
476gument to non-university education contexts, with one scholar sug-
gesting that Grutter's "non-remedial justifications for the use of race"
were actually foreshadowed by judge Posner in Wittmer.47 Before the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in GrutterJudge Posner, in Reynolds
v. City of Chicago , recognized that operational needs were "com-
pletely different" from remedial grounds 479  Although the Reynolds
court found no past discrimination against Hispanics that justified
the promotion of an Hispanic policeman, it concluded that the city's
minority promotion program "was justifiable in order to make the po-
lice force more effective in performing its duties."
48
411While the same court noted in Petit v. City of Chicago that it was
"odd" to liken police department examinations that comprised the
criterion for promotion to university admissions programs,4 2 it did
not eschew from applying Grutter's reasoning to conclude that "there
is an even more compelling need for diversity in a large metropolitan
police force charged with protecting a racially and ethnically divided
major American city. '43 Just as Grutter deferred to a university's aca-
City of Newark, 463 F.3d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 2006). Even were the city to have raised the
defense, the Lomack court posited, "no evidence supports it." Id.
473 Id. at 310 n.8.
474 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996).
475 But see Paul Frymer & John D. Skrenny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action: Law and
the New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677, 695-96 (2004) (noting that
the Seventh Circuit "is not alone in promoting the legality of instrumental uses of race"
and citing Fourth Circuit and district court cases).
476 See, e.g., Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 919 ("[Ljaw-enforcement and correctional settings [are sin-
gled out] as the very clearest examples of cases in which departures from racial neutrality
are permissible.").
477 Fridkin, supra note 467, at 517.
478 296 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2002).
479 Id. at 529.
480 Id. The need, apparently, was rooted in two arguments. First, Hispanic lieutenants, as
department supervisors, "set the tone for the department," decreasing the likelihood that
non-Hispanic officers would be sensitized to "special problems" specific to policing His-
panic neighborhoods. Id. at 530. Second, effective execution of the duties of the police
"requires that the police have the trust of that community [to which the officer belongs]
and they are more likely to have it if they have 'ambassadors' to the community of the
same ethnicity." Id.
481 352 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1079 (2004).
482 Id. at 1112.
483 Id. at 1114; see also Horwitz, supra note 372, at 569 n.493; David Orentlicher, Diversity: A
Fundamental American Principle, 70 Mo. L. REv. 777, 805 n.145 (2005) (relying on Petit to
establish the proposition that "diversity in the workplace would be beneficial in other
public agencies whose employees have frequent interaction with a diverse public").
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demic judgments, the Seventh Circuit "believe[d] that it is
proper ... to rely on the views of experts and Chicago police execu-
tives."484 Noting that the police department issued examinations and
"standardized the scores based on race ''48 in order to account for sta-
tistical error,486 the Petit court found that the city's determinations
were not unlike those considered in Grutter, where "race can be a
'plus' factor in the context of individualized consideration of each
and every applicant., 48 7 Moreover, given that the city's promotions
were based upon an examination system that was time-limited, the
court found that the promotion program the city employed satisfied
Grutter's mandate.4 8   Thus, Petit serves as an "important example of
the way in which Grutter can be extended beyond the educational
context."
48 9
C. Implications of the Broad Interpretation ofGrutter
The Grutter Court "extended the application of academic freedom
to university admissions decisions, an area far beyond the scope
originally contemplated by the Court., 490 In so doing, the Court held
itself prostrate to "the voices of the military, the captains of industry,
[and the] leaders of education,.. . [who were] critically important in
persuading the Court that racial diversity is essential, not simply
within the legal academy, but in the economy, military, and cul-
ture."49' Beginning with Wittmer and Reynolds and ultimately culminat-
ing in Petit, a nexus between Grutter's academic diversity context and
an "operational needs" justification becomes more acutely pro-
nounced.
484 Petit, 352 F.3d at 1114.
485 Id. at 1117.
486 Id. Scores were adjusted to account for disparate, "skewed results" that occurred based
upon the day on which the examination was administered. Brain A. Maravent, Is the
Rooney Rule Affirmative Action? Analyzing the NFL's Mandate to Its Clubs Regarding Coaching
andFront Office Hires, 13 SPORTS LAW.J. 233, 261 (2006) (discussing Petitand Grutterwithin
the context of hiring coaches and administrators within the National Football League).
487 Petit, 352 F.3d at 1116-17.
488 Id. at 1118. The court noted that the city ceased race-conscious promotions after the
1991 examinations, further support that the system implemented was for a short period
of time. Id. Yet Grutter permitted at least a quarter-century to pass before any race-
conscious admissions program be phased out. See infra note 495 and accompanying text.
489 Ronald Turner, Grutter, the Diversity Justiflcation, and Workplace Affirmative Action, 43
BRANDEIS L.J. 199, 221 (2004).
490 Caplen, supra note 368, at 4.
491 Sylvia A. Law, Where Do We Go From Here? The Fourteenth Amendment, Original Intent, and Pre-
sent Realities, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 691, 705 (2004).
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1. Impact Across the Jurisprudential Landscape
It has been recognized that the "precedential value of Grutter is
uncertain .... [because] the case may or may not be limited to the
educational context in which it was decided." 492  The application of
Grutter by the Reynolds and Petit courts, 493 however, suggests the judici-
ary's approval of race-conscious decision-making in circumstances
wherein "exposure to a racially diverse environment" is likely, if not494
necessary. Given the fact that Grutter "will remain the law of the
land for at least the next quarter of a century,' ' 495 its potential applica-
tions beyond the educational context are virtually endless since "at-
taining cross-cultural competence does not end with a di-
ploma .... ,496 Thus, it is reasonable to anticipate Grutter's impact
across a wide jurisprudential landscape: from its "migration to the
employment context"497 of workplace diversity under Title VII 49s and
application within the healthcare profession,499 to Tide IX gender dis-
crimination in athletics 5 ° and infiltration into the jury selection proc-
501
ess.
2. Validating "Plus-Factor" Selection Processes
The Grutter Court's approval of race as a "plus-factor" determinant
in university admissions was premised upon holistic, individualized
492 Spann, supra note 450, at 226.
493 Although predating the Supreme Court's review of Grutter, Reynolds relied upon the Sixth
Circuit's en banc Grutter decision, Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir.
2002), which the Court ultimately affirmed.
494 Norton, supra note 460, at 572.
495 Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Destruction of the Holistic Approach to Admissions: The Pernicious
Effects of Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 309, 310 (2006); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
343 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial pref-
erences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today."); id. at 346
("From today's vantage point, one may hope... that over the next generation's span,
progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make it safe to
sunset affirmative action.").
496 Norton, supra note 460, at 572.
497 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 382, at 1448.
498 See generally Estlund, supra note 403.
499 See Norton, supra note 460, at 571-72 (applying the rationale for racially diverse work-
forces to the healthcare setting).
500 See, e.g.,Joseph Z. Fleming, Title IX From the Red Rose Grew to Grutter: The Law and Litera-
ture of Sports, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 793 (2004) (arguing that Grut-
ter's diversity pronouncements bolster the constitutionality of Title IX).
501 See Wilkenfeld, supra note 415, at 2293 (arguing that Grutter enables "discrimination-
such as that engaged in when judges focus on the ethnic composition ofjuries-[tol sur-
vive an equal protection challenge").
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consideration of an applicant. 50 Adhering to Grutter's mandate re-
quires any selection process, regardless of application of the "opera-
tional needs" justification, to similarly utilize race as one of several
criteria applied on an individualized basis. 503 Only in this way, Grutter
instructs, will such a process survive constitutional challenge. 5°4  For
example, the "plus-factor" principle, which Justice Powell favored in
Bakke and the Court explicitly adopted in Grutter, has been invoked to
permit states' use of race as "one element among many that deter-
mines the shape districts take. 5 °5
If affirmative action constitutes "minority-mindfulness in deci-
sionmaking resulting in... a preference,"06 then quantifying the
precise amount of "mindfulness" that factors into a decision is virtu-
ally impossible. 57 Grutter's good-faith presumption to educational in-
stitutions, extended by the Seventh Circuit to police departments in
Petit,50 ' has limitless application and substantial repercussions. Vali-
dating selection processes in which a "plus-factor" for race is one
component encourages those exercising the decision-making author-
ity "to conduct themselves with near-total impunity., 519 If the "admin-
502 Under its admissions policy, administrators evaluate "all the information available in [an
applicant's] file, including a personal statement, letters of recommendation, and an essay
describing the ways in which the applicant will contribute to the life and diversity of the
Law School." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315 (2003). The policy, with its consid-
eration of race as a "plus-factor," "remain[s] flexible enough to ensure that each appli-
cant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant's race or eth-
nicity the defining feature of his or her application." Id. at 337. But see infra note 507.
503 See supra note 502.
504 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337 (distinguishing the law school 'plus-factor' admissions policy
from the policy at issue in Gratz, which awarded "mechanical, predetermined diversity
'bonuses' based on race or ethnicity").
505 T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitu-
tional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 648 (1993) (emphasis added).
506 Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119, 120 n.3 (2003).
507 See Eric Slater, Lawsuit Charges UC Admissions with Fraud, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 1995, at B4
(stating that the University of California system "has 'made a secret' of the weight that
race carries during the admissions process"). Although the "Harvard Plan," appended to
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, notes that a "farm boy from Idaho can bring something
to Harvard College that a Bostonian cannot offer," Regents of University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978), what that something constitutes remains undefined and
amorphous. For an empirical discussion of the complexity of admissions decisions and
the theory that "the American public has a more expansive notion of merit than the lead-
ing protagonists in the affirmative action debate," see Carol M. Swain et al., Life after
Bakke Where Whites and Blacks Agree: Public Support for Fairness in Educational Opportunities,
16 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 147, 149, 165-79 (2000).
508 See supra Part IV.B.3.
509 Caplen, supra note 367, at 864; see alsoJessica Garrison, The Nation; Yale Accuses Princeton in
Hack Attack, L.A. TIMES, July 26, 2002, at 1 (reporting that admissions personnel from
Princeton University infiltrated Yale University's "online admissions notification system
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istrative and judicial safeguards" that protect students within the ad-
missions context are "unknown,"510 leaving the only way to potentially
unveil the secrecy of admissions decisions5 ' to the courts,512 then
those safeguards are similarly unascertainable in other contexts. 513 A
particular cause of concern, therefore, arises within any context
wherein a "plus-factor" racial element is employed within a selection
calculus. The realm of jury selection, with the incorporation of soft-
ware to inform voir dire and the exercise of peremptory challenges of
514prospective jurors, is no exception s.
V. RAMIFICATIONS OF INTERSECTING, COMPETING PRINCIPLES
Having advanced the position that Grutter extends "beyond the
education setting, '515 it is not difficult to parallel similarities between
university admissions' selection processes and the voir dire selection516
process. Just as a "unique and essential feature of the jury is its de-
and looked through student files during the peak college admissions period in April...
to see confidential admissions decisions on 11 students who applied to both universi-
ties").
510 Caplen, supra note 368, at 31.
511 See Garrison, supra note 509, at 1 (noting that admissions decisions are confidential).
512 See George R. Kramer, Note, Title VII On Campus: Judicial Review of University Employment
Decisions, 82 COLUM. L. REa. 1206, 1224 n. 110 (1982) (citing Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), for the proposition that "admissions decisions can be made re-
viewable by courts through a private right of action").
513 See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 193 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating, in a case where an
auction of sealed bids was used to choose counsel in class action litigation, "[t]hrowing a
veil of secrecy over the selection process deprives class members of [the] opportu-
nity .... [to] exercise effective control" in the selection of counsel); EEOC v. Ford Motor
Co., 645 F.2d 183, 198 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 458 U.S. 219 (1982) (noting that a "secret se-
lection process" facilitated an environment of "'loose... procedures' which 'operated to
perpetuate the status quo'"); Doyle v. United States, 220 Cl. Ct. 285, 292 (Cl. Ct. 1979)
(acknowledging, in a lawsuit by military officers who alleged they were passed over for
promotion by selection boards, that there was "uncertainty concerning the mechanics of
the selection process" because the proceedings were conducted in secrecy); Arizona Bd.
of Regents v. Phoenix Newspaper, 806 P.2d 348, 353 (Ariz. 1991) (Corcoran, J., dissent-
ing) (disagreeing with majority's holding that university's board of regents was not re-
quired to release information on all prospective candidates for university president posi-
tion and stating that the "secret process of selection used by the Board of Regents in this
case is at odds with the Public Records Law").
514 See infta Part V.
515 Haddon, supra note 366, at 552; see also Wilkenfeld, supra note 415, at 2304 ("While the
Grutter case dealt with the issue of affirmative action in education, its influence reaches
far beyond these limits."); supra Part IV.B-C.
516 See supra Part III.C.3. Education has been characterized as "unique from employment,
minority business contracts and re-districting," but not from jury selection. Roy Carleton
Howell, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Bakke Has Been Affirmed, 26 N.C. CENT. L.J.
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liberative decision-making role" ' that ensures that the "trial process
[is] open to jurors who will contribute to the 'robust exchange of
ideas' in deliberation, ' '5 18 universities similarly share a "unique goal of
'paramount importance' to have 'students who will contribute the
most to the robust exchange of ideas.',, 519 If Batson and its progeny
"have made a further muck of things by transforming voir dire into a
lengthy ordeal involving inquiries into inappropriate questions of
race and ethnicity, 52 0 then factoring Grutters "sorry muddle of 'utter
logical confusion' 521 into the equation presents devastating conse-
quences for peremptory challenge jurisprudence, particularly when
considering the equivocal software variable. 52
A. Applying Grutter to the Jury Selection Process
Scholars focus upon citizenship elements shared by both Grutters
majority and the jury selection process5 2 and forecast that "Grutter
creates the possibility for litigants to encourage courts to carry over
the interest in a fair cross section at the venire stage to the composi-
tion of the jury." 24 The opposite, in fact, occurs within the software
context. Utilizing race as a "plus-factor, 525 together with various crite-
ria, lawyers can attribute varying weight in order to produce statisti-
cally favorable juries; 526 Grutter encourages and promotes a validly
38, 43 (2003); see also Wilkenfeld, supra note 415, at 2307 (stating that "jury diversity is
akin to diversity in education").
517 Haddon, supra note 366, at 552.
518 Id. at 553 (footnote omitted).
519 Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 475, at 680 n.19 (citation omitted) (quoting Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978)); see supra note 473 and accompanying
text.
520 Laura I. Appelman, Reports ofBatson s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated: How the Batson
Doctrine Enforces a Normative Framework of Legal Ethics, 78 TEMP. L. REv. 607, 630 (2005).
521 Stuart Taylor, Jr., Getting Serious About Race: The Next 25 Years, 35 NAT'LJ. 2085 (2003); see
also Colin S. Diver, From Equality to Diversity: The Detour from Brown to Grutter, 2004 U. ILL.
L. REv. 691, 713 (2004) (arguing that Grutter's reasoning is "amorphous").
522 See Victoria Loe, Fear of Computing; Study Finds Rampant Technophobia, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, July 27, 1993, at 4D (noting that new technologies are "difficult to understand"
and that a majority of adults "find the pace of change in technology confusing").
523 See supra note 519.
524 Haddon, supra note 366, at 553; see also Wilkenfeld, supra note 415, at 2292 (arguing that
Grutter legitimizes "judicial attempts to ensure that petit juries reflect the diversity of their
communities").
525 See supra Part IV.C.2.
526 See Review: SmartJury, LAW OFFICE COMPUTING, Oct./Nov. 2003, available
at http://www.lawofficecomputing.com/EDC/articles/review.php.year=2003&month=
oct-nov&review file=S&review category=litigation.support&reviewtitle=SmartJury (not-
ing that users can "modify" demographic scoring for any of the ranked criteria).
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constitutional software scheme in which "race... still matters,
527
without threat of succumbing to Batson challenges. Ways in which
Grutter's "intellectually muddled"'5 2 principles dilute and drown Bat-
son in a sea of superfluity within the software context and how those
uses substantially threaten to tamper with the legal system follow.
52 9
1. Batson's Step One: Taking a Byte out of Inferences of Discrimination
Parties asserting Batson challenges must establish a prima facie
case of discrimination. 5 °3 0  To that end, the party must demonstrate
"facts and any other relevant circumstances" that raise an inference of
race-based exclusion.531  Raising these inferences in response to soft-
ware that accords varying weight upon multiple criteria, however, be-
comes problematic.5 3 2 With a wide array of indicia-including race-
factoring into the calculus used to inform exercise of peremptory
strikes, 533 any exclusion could be effectuated after execution of multi-
ple permutations based upon indiscernible computations of "system-
atic evidence ofjuror values by demographic and social groupings.,5
4
As one software program developer recognizes, "[p]erception is
inherently selective, and values are one of the mechanisms through
which selective perception takes place. ,5 35 Thus, while a challenger
may perceive that a peremptory strike violated Batson, the requisite
inference needed to sustain the objection may, by virtue of the man-
ner in which the interactive software calculates user perceptions, fall•536
short of this threshold requirement. Because the software is de-
signed to consider multiple, objective factors 37 together with indi-
vidualized and customized subjective factors such as lawyers' back-
527 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
528 Charles Krauthammer, Ruling Puts the Ball Back in Proper Court, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH
(Va.),June 27, 2003, at A19.
529 See supra text accompanying note 49 and accompanying text.
530 See supra Part III.C.1.
531 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986); supra notes 307 & 309 and accompanying
text.
532 See supra note 526 and accompanying text.
533 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
534 JuryQuest, supra note 90.
535 Id.
536 See supra note 339 and accompanying text.
537 See supra note 96.
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grounds and experiences, a party's ability to infer discriminatory
motivation is substantially hindered 39
One might argue that software use is indistinguishable from non-
computerized jury selection. Yet, in many ways, the software's plat-
form mirrors selection processes of university administrators, who as-
sess both objective factors 4 as well as non-quantifiable intangibles
the Court terms "'soft' variables. 5 4' Admissions decisions, however,
are virtually unassailable, and a Batson challenger would likely en-
counter similar difficulty attacking peremptory strikes informed by
software. Like an admissions policy conforming to Grutter's pro-
nouncements, which considers race but avoids quantification of an
exact "critical mass" in order to avoid creating quotas,543 software can
account for race as an unquantifiable "plus factor" within its broader
"mathematical formulas, 544 that generate juror rankings. 545 Any race-
based exclusions stemming from software usage, therefore, would
likely be insulated from attack due to an abundance of quantitative
538 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
539 SeeJohnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005) (stating that Batson is designed to re-
spond to "suspicions and inferences" of racially-motivated peremptory challenges).
540 "[A]dmissions officials must consider the applicant's undergraduate grade point average
(GPA) and Law School Admission Test (LSAT) score because they are important (if im-
perfect) predictors of academic success in law school." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
315 (2003). For objective factors jury selection software considers, see supra note 96.
541 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315; see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Harvard College's admissions program, which acknowl-
edges that it considers "differences in the background and outlook that students bring
with them," such as the case where "[a] farm boy from Idaho can bring something to
Harvard College that a Bostonian cannot offer"). For "soft" variable factors jury selection
software considers, see supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
542 See Caplen, supra note 367, at 864 (noting that Grutter permits "university administrators
to conduct themselves with near-total impunity"). By affirming the University of Michi-
gan Law School's admissions policy, Grutter implicitly affirmed admissions decisions de-
cided under that system. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316. Although Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244 (2003), invalidated the undergraduate admissions policy, the Court neither analyzed
the qualifications of rejected candidates nor scrutinized those decisions. See generally id.
Moreover, the Court did not retroactively admit students rejected under the invalidated
admissions policy, a remedy mooted by the passage of time. See id. at 249-52 (noting one
of the litigants' subsequent graduation from another institution); see also De Funis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319 (1974) (rendering as moot a claim against a law school
"[b]ecause the petitioner will complete his law school studies at the end of the term for
which he has now registered regardless of any decision this Court might reach on the
merits of this litigation"). Thus, constitutionality of an admissions regime under which
decisions were based did not affect those underlying decisions. See supra Part IV.C.2.
543 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 381 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("In practice, the Law School's pro-
gram bears little or no relation to its asserted goal of achieving 'critical mass.'").
544 Horowitz, supra note 97.
545 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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rie.546and qualitative variables upon which the program relies. As such,14 548
lawyers' "scientifically informed"547 decisions to strike jurors, like
university admissions decisions, would be immune from review, ren-
dering any perceived exclusion on account of race far removed from
purposeful exclusion and below the threshold of disproportionate
impac t.54
9
2. Batson's Step Two: The "Inclusionary Value" of Exclusion
5 0
Assuming arguendo that a challenge to computer-informed per-
emptory challenges survives Batson's first step, difficulties abound at
the second step.551 Under Batson, the proponent of an alleged race-
based strike must, once an objecting party establishes a prima facie
case of discrimination, provide a "neutral explanation" for the chal-
lenge.552  In Miller-El, the Court acknowledged that facially neutral
reasons must meet a minimum level not justifiable by "after-
thought.''5 3  Ultimately, the reasons proffered will either "stand or
fall on the [basis of] plausibility.,
5 4
The software affords defenders of peremptory challenges numer-
ous avenues through which to maneuver in order to assert non-racial
justifications for exercising peremptory strikes.555 Software calcula-
tions may be utilized as a sword: they are presumably scientific and
mathematical, products of a coalescence of numerous indicia of
546 The software eliminates lawyers' reliance upon inexact hunches or instincts, see supra
notes 31-32 and accompanying text, themselves veritable breeding grounds for attacking
improper race-based peremptory challenges.
547 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
548 Ultimately, the lawyer must make the decision to exclude a juror. See supra text accom-
panying note 108.
549 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976), and
requiring racially discriminatory conduct be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose);
see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 267 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("At Batson's
first step, litigants remain free to misuse peremptory challenges as long as the strikes fall
below the prima facie threshold level."); see supra Part IV.C.2.
550 Haddon, supra note 366, at 555.
551 See supra notes 311-16 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.C.2.
552 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986).
553 Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 246.
554 Id. at 252.
555 See Latest Legal Tool, supra note 95 (noting that it is in this respect that the software can
be truly characterized as "innovative"); see alsoJ.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 145 n.17
(1991) ("No doubt the voir dire process aids litigants in their ability to articulate race-
neutral explanations for their peremptory challenges."). Moreover, "identification of
subjective criteria by scientific and technical processes [enables lawyers] to either exploit
or eliminate the juror" without oversight. Sahler, supra note 32, at 406; see infra Part V.B.
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which race is one element.556 Thus, lawyers may assert an array of
neutral justifications-any non-racial factor, in fact, built into the
software's calculus-for removing jurors.557  Additionally, software
calculations may be utilized as a shield. Because the software calcu-
lates multiple factors to produce objective rankings, lawyers may ar-
gue an incapability of determining the influence one factor-such as
race-contributed to each rating. 58 As neutral explanations, both al-
ternatives are devoid of "pretextual significance" and are plausible.55 9
Furthermore, the software user's methodology, analogous to univer-
sity admissions decisions, remains protected from the court under "a
veil of secrecy."060 Consequently, the software may diminish lawyer
accountability and responsibility for decisions from the jury selection
equation, enabling parties to justify race-based peremptories under
non-racial pretexts, thereby "vitiat[ing] ... constitutional protec-
',561tions.
3. Batson's Step Three: Replacing Court Monitoring with Computer
Monitors
Lawyer accountability is only as effective as judicial oversight ofS• 562
both the software and voir dire. As to the latter, while Batson was
designed to "subject more peremptory challenges to judicial scrutiny
and to counteract the discriminatory manipulation of jury selection
563 .. 564procedures," increased judicial scrutiny continues to waver to
556 See supra notes 96 & 102-03 and accompanying text.
557 See infra note 558.
558 The Court addressed this situation in JE.B. v. Alabama:
Failing to provide jurors the same protection against gender discrimination as race
discrimination could frustrate the purpose of Batson itself. Because gender and
race are overlapping categories, gender can be used as a pretext for racial dis-
crimination. Allowing parties to remove racial minorities from the jury not be-
cause of their race, but because of their gender [or other classification] could in-
sulate effectively racial discrimination from judicial scrutiny.
511 U.S. at 145 (footnote omitted).
559 See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 252; JE.B., 511 U.S. at 145.
560 Neal Kumar Katyal, The Promise and Precondition of Educational Autonomy, 31 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 557, 566 (2003); see also Paul G. Haskell, The University as Trustee, 17 GA. L.
REv. 1, 25 (1982) ("One of the more carefully kept secrets in educational administration
is admissions policy.")
561 Hinkle, supra note 258, at 169.
562 By its nature, the peremptory challenge was permitted "without judicial scrutiny." Page,
supra note 314, at 158. Cf Goodwin, supra note 19, at 739, 749 n.103 (acknowledging ju-
dicial scrutiny with regard to peremptory strikes against cognizable groups).
563 Leading Cases: Equal Protection, 119 HARV. L. REV. 218, 219 (2005).
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"latitude allowed in the exercise of peremptory strikes."5 65  The
Court's extensive detail of manipulative techniques employed by the
prosecution in Miller-El, 566 however, reflects its condemnation of "dis-
missive and strained interpretation[s]" of evidence by reviewing
courts. 561 Moreover, Miller-El suggests that courts must be actively en-
gaged in, rather than removed from, voir dire.5-6
Software usage, by further removing courts from an active role
during voir dire, undermines these ideals. Because "[t] echnological
standards are internally constrained by their inability to be designed
as general legal norms that approximate both individual judicial de-
terminations and socially beneficial jurisprudence, 566 software me
chanics may be difficult to understand and explain when questioned
by courts. s70 Computer illiteracy and "a reluctance to use ... new
technology" on the part of judges and lawyers alike 57 dissuades scru-
tiny of incomprehensible elements contained within the software and
the ratings it calculates.7 Consequently, a court's ability to discern,
under Batson's third step, the reasonableness of a proffered neutral
explanation for a peremptory strike is significantly inhibited.
57 3
Moreover, in the absence of uniform policies regarding software us-
age, educating the court in its mechanics will likely be cumbersome,
delaying voir dire with disruptive technological inquiry, and overall
impacting the expeditious administration of a court's caseload.
564 See Cox, supra note 150, at 771 ("[J]udicial decisions have placed limitations on preemp-
tory challenges, making them subject to the court's scrutiny by forcing attorneys to dis-
close their reasons for strikingjurors they believe will be biased.").
565 Kirk Pittard, Comment, Withstanding Batson Muster: What Constitutes a Neutral Explana-
tion?, 50 BAYLOR L. REv. 985, 986 (1998).
566 See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 253-65 (2005).
567 Id. at 265 (citation omitted).
568 See supra note 358 and accompanying text.
569 Daniel Benoliel, Comment, Technological Standards, Inc.: Rethinking Cyberspace Regula-
tory Epistemology, 92 CALIF. L. REv. 1069, 1102 (2004).
570 See supra note 522.
571 Roger Philip Kerans & Patrick Keys, Use of Electronic Appeal Transcripts in the Alberta Court of
Appeal, 2 J. APP. PRAc. & PROCESS 329, 343 (2000) (describing the "technophobia" of
some lawyers and judges); see also Kristina G. Van Arsdel, Note, Burdine v. Johnson: The
Fifth Circuit Wakes Up, But the Supreme Court Refuses to Put the Sleeping Attorney Standard to
Rest, 39 Hous. L. REv. 835, 865 n.269 (2002) (noting "judges' reluctance to use [e-
courtroom] technology").
572 See, e.g., Patti Waldmeir, Supreme Court Goes Hands-Off on Innovation: Ageing US Justices Try
to Encourage Advances in Technology that Will Shape the Economy for Decades to Comne FIN. TIMES
(London), July 5, 2005, at 10 (noting the age of the Supreme Court justices and their
"rare display ofjudicial humility in the face of technology").
573 See supra notes 316-17 and accompanying text; supra Part III.C.2.
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B. Ethical Considerations for Lawyers
Just as the judiciary may be presently ill-equipped to address the
impact of software upon voir dire, "legal ethics have not kept pace"
with advanced jury selection techniques.574 The Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct "do not bar or place any restrictions on attorneys
using jury consultants" or software.' 7' Within the past five years, "jury
selection standards, professional standards, practice guidelines, and
ethical principles" have been proposed,576 but "[d]ebates about the
ethical issues associated with scientific jury selection" persist.5" Not-
withstanding a lawyer's ethical duty to zealously represent clients5 78 by
selecting jurors whose impaneling would favor clients' cases,579 a law-
yer's current limitations only concern candor requirements proscrib-
ing knowingly presenting "false statement[s] of fact" when providing
neutral explanations to the court and ensuring that software is util-
ized appropriately.5 0  Consequently, software, designed, in part, to
"predetermine or appear to predetermine" a case's outcome, 5" pre-
sents serious ethical challenges requiring consideration and reflec-
tion in order to prevent lawyers from using technology "to evade the
bars of the Equal Protection cases [that] may potentially contribute
to the denial of Equal Protection.""58
VI. CONCLUSION
Jury selection software offers an infusion of science into a realm
typically characterized as an art form. Its introduction into court-
574 Sahler, supra note 32, at 406 (discussing the inability of legal ethics to stay apace of jury
selection techniques).
575 Maureen E. Lane, Note, Twelve Carefully Selected Not So Angry Men: Are Jury Consultants De-
stroying the American Legal System?, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 463, 475 (1999).
576 Steven C. Serio, Comment, A Process Right Due? Examining Whether a Capital Defendant Has
a Due Process Right to a jury Selection Expert, 53 Am. U. L. REv. 1143, 1151 n.41 (2004).
577 Richard L. Wiener & Dennis P. Stolle, Trial Consulting: Jurors' and Attorneys' Perceptions of
Murder, 34 CAL. W. L. REv. 225, 227 (1997); see also Abbe Smith, "Nice Work If You Can Get
It": "Ethical"Jury Selection in Criminal Defense, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 538 (1998) (ac-
knowledging that "social justice might be advanced by prohibiting certain legal practices,
however, this does not resolve the question of professional ethics" (footnote omitted));
supra note 59 and accompanying text.
578 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl.; see supra text accompanying note 123.
579 MichaelJ. Saks, The Limits of ScientificJuy Selection: Ethical and Empirical, 17JURIMETRICSJ.
3, 6 (1976). But see supra text accompanying note 78.
580 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.3(a) (1).
581 Sahler, supra note 32, at 406.
582 Id. (footnote omitted).
583 See supra Part I.A.
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rooms across the country may afford litigants a greater opportunity to
establish a rapport with prospective jurors and expeditiously con-
clude jury selection by finely tuning voir dire questioning. 58 4 Notwith-
standing these laudable goals, incorporation of this technology into
voir dire potentially undermines established jurisprudential prece-
dent protecting litigants and jurors from impermissible denial of
equal protection afforded by the Constitution.
5 s
1
Because the software rates jurors after considering various factors,
including race, its selection process is akin to the procedures in
which university admissions offices engage when identifying and iso-
587lating ideal applicants to whom offers are extended. In this way,
Grutter places an imprimatur of constitutionality upon software that
effectively engages in a similar calculus within a different context.
Because software that calculates race as a "plus-factor" may be permis-
sibly used during voir dire based upon Grutter58 9 it runs afoul of the
protections against race-based discriminatory peremptory challenges
set forth in Batson.80 Software usage poses a threat to undermining
each part of Batson's three-step standard, 51 leaving litigants and ju-
rors with virtually no protections against improper exercise of per-
emptory strikes. As litigants continue to embrace technology in the
courtroom, neither the courts nor the profession's ethical canons are
currently equipped to keep pace and address related concerns.593
Until the profession does so, software infusion into the jury selection
process presents a Grutter-Batson dilemma greater than the "large
loophole" the Court has attempted to fill since Batson.594 As a result,
litigants may effectively conceal all racially motivated decisions to ex-
clude jurors, evade the protections set forth in Batson,595 and reverse
achievements of the Civil Rights era on the basis of "plus-factor" se-
lection processes and in the name of technological advancement.
596
584 See supra notes 80 & 84-87 and accompanying text.
585 See supra text accompanying note 582; Parts V.A. 1-3.
586 See supra Part I.C.
587 See supra notes 93 & 539-49 and accompanying text.
588 See supra Parts IV.C. 1-2; V.A. 1-3.
589 See supra Part 1V.C.2.
590 See supra text accompanying notes 525-28.
591 See supra Parts V.A. 1-3.
592 See supra text accompanying notes 581-82.
593 See supra Part V.B; note 59 and accompanying text.
594 See supra text accompanying note 349.
595 See supra notes 345-49 and accompanying text.
596 See supra text accompanying notes 49, 125-26.
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